



LDRRMF UTILIZATION PATTERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT:

The cases of Local Government Units
Virac and Dolores, Philippines



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ABOUT THE REPORT

This research is an initiative of the **Strengthening Harmonized Action for Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Early Recovery (SHARPER) Project** that aims to enhance disaster preparedness, response, and recovery capacities of thirty-two (32) highly vulnerable barangays in two provinces in the Philippines towards enabling them to co-lead future post-disaster humanitarian and recovery actions with the local authorities and other actors. The project, which is part of the **Asia Community Disaster Preparedness & Transformation (ACT) Program**, is being implemented by **Oxfam Pilipinas**, together with partners **Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Response Network (PDRRN)** and **Sentro para sa Ikauunlad ng Katutubong Agham at Teknolohiya (SIKAT)** in six municipalities in Eastern Samar and Catanduanes.

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The publication of this report aims to share research results, contribute to public debate, and invite feedback on development and humanitarian policy and practice. It does not necessarily reflect the policy positions of the organizations jointly publishing it. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the individual organizations.

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ABOUT THE COVER

Self-help groups (SHGs) of Brgy. Malobago in Dolores, Eastern Samar and their families participate in the community disaster preparedness simulation drill conducted last July 2022 by Oxfam Pilipinas and Sentro para sa Ikauunlad ng Katutubong Agham at Teknolohiya (SIKAT), in collaboration with the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office of Dolores. The activity is part of the interventions of the Strengthening Harmonized Action for Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Early Recovery (SHARPER) Project.

Photo: Jenny Gacutno/Oxfam Pilipinas

ABSTRACT

This study looks into the disaster risk reduction and management policy framework and practice in the Philippines, particularly the budget performance of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF) provided for by Republic Act 10121 or the PDRRM Act of 2010. While the Philippine Government cites budget constraints in strengthening community resiliency, supporting early recovery efforts and towards the long haul, the Commission on Audit (COA) detects a year-on-year underutilization of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) funds both at the National and Local Governments citing the ‘reactive type of disaster spending’, or cutting back expenditures for fear of DBM/COA disallowance (Commission on Audit, 2013, p. 32). The study aims to validate this nine-year old conclusion of COA if it still lingers to this day. By budget scoping and employing a social accountability approach, the study found that the Philippine DRRM spending remains reactive. Particularly, LGUs are found to less likely spend their 70 percent mitigation fund than their 30 percent QRF that requires the declaration of a State of Calamity. This spending is also found to be not sensitive to the differential impacts of disasters to vulnerable groups. However, given their COVID-19 experience, LGUs proved that they are capable of drastically adjusting their directions and reinforcing their actions as a reflex for survival. On the other hand, given the social accountability approach, non-state actors were observed to be capable of articulating their views and express their wealth of DRR experiences contrary to the common observation of passive participation in LDRRMCs.

Keywords: *Public Expenditure Review, LDRRMF, Community Score Card, LGU-Virac, LGU-Dolores*



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ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------|---|
| AA | Anticipatory Action |
| AIP | Annual Investment Plan |
| AOM | Audit Observation Memoranda |
| BARMM | Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao |
| BPfA | Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action |
| CCA | Climate Change Adaptation |
| CCCM | Camp Coordination and Camp Management |
| CEPC | Comprehensive Emergency Program for Children |
| CMCI | Cities and Municipalities Competitive Index |
| CO | Capital Outlay |
| COA | Commission on Audit |
| CRED | Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters |
| CRI | Climate Risk Index |
| CSC | Community Score Card |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DBM | Department of Budget and Management |
| DILG | Department of the Interior and Local Government |
| DM | Disaster Management |
| DND | Department of National Defense |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| DRRM | Disaster Risk Reduction and Management |
| DRRMC | Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| DRRMF | Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund |
| DSWD | Department of Social Welfare and Development |
| ECHO | European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations |
| EO | Executive Order |
| FDP | Financial Disclosure Portal |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GAA | General Appropriations Act |
| GAD | Gender and Development |
| GAR | Global Assessment Report |
| GBV | Gender-based Violence |
| GEWE | Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment |
| GOCC | Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation |
| HFA | Hyogo Framework of Action |
| IATF | Inter-Agency Task Force |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IEC | Information, Education and Communication |
| IRA | Internal Revenue Allotment |
| JMC | Joint Memorandum Circular |

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| LBC | Local Budget Circular |
| LBM | Local Budget Memorandum |
| LCDO | Local Civil Defense Organization |
| LDP | Local Development Plan |
| LDRRM | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management |
| LDRRMAIP | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Annual Investment Plan |
| LDRRMC | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| LDRRMF | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund |
| LDRRMFP | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Financial Plan |
| LDRRMIP | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Investment Plan |
| LDRRMO | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office |
| LDRRMP | Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan |
| LGBTQI | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex |
| LGU | Local Government Unit |
| MC | Memorandum Circular |
| MDRRM | Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management |
| MEALSA | Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Social Accountability |
| MOA | Memorandum of Agreement |
| MOOE | Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses |
| NCDA | National Civil Defense Administrator |
| NCDC | National Civil Defense Council |
| NDCC | National Disaster Coordinating Council |
| NDRRM | National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management |
| NDRRMC | National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| NDRRMF | National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund |
| NGA | National Government Agency |
| NSO | National Statistics Office |
| OCD | Office of Civil Defense |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| PCIC | Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation |
| PD | Presidential Decree |
| PDRRN | People’s Disaster Risk Reduction Network |
| PPA | Programs, Projects, and Activities |
| PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |
| PPMP | Project Procurement and Management Plan |
| PSA | Philippine Statistics Authority |
| PWD | Person with Disability |
| QRF | Quick Response Fund |
| RA | Republic Act |
| RDNA | Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment |
| SARO | Special Allotment Release Order |
| SFDRR | Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction |
| SHARPER | Strengthening Community Preparedness, Rapid Response and Recovery |

| | |
|---------------|---|
| SIKAT | Sentro para sa Ikauunlad ng Katutubong Agham at Teknolohiya |
| STF | Special Trust Fund |
| TWG | Technical Working Group |
| UNDRR | United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Fund |
| UNISDR | UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policies may have kept pace with the current global framework; however, DRR spending and implementation remain to be reactive. The government's underspending remains large at Php118.44 billion within the 2016–2020 period. Php38.42 billion (32.4 percent) of that came from Appropriated but not Allotted funds for release, while another Php80.02 billion (67 percent) remained unspent despite being Allotted, and are carried over onto succeeding years. It represents the magnitude of lackadaisical DRR spending in the Philippines; a missed opportunity to improve resilience in every year that is it supposed to be spent. The Local DRRM Fund is the primary source of underspending, followed by the National DRRM Fund, and lastly, the National Government Agencies' (NGA) Quick Response Funds (QRF).

At the local government level, the DRRM fund has increased from 2016 to 2021, but suboptimal use is evident especially in the use of the 70 percent mitigation/prevention fund. Local Governments are less likely to use the 70 percent of their Local DRRMF (LDRRMF) than the 30 percent response and recovery funds. This practice was already flagged down by the Commission on Audit (COA) way back in 2013 as a 'reactive spending pattern'. Our projection indicates that this 30 percent response and recovery fund will be negative in 2025 onwards, concomitant with Global Assessment Report (GAR) 2022 forecasts of increased disaster risks.

The structure of DRR expenditures from sampled Provincial Local Government Units (LGUs) is oriented towards infrastructure projects. This bundle of expenditures topped the list with 30.16 percent combined shares in the 2019–2021 period. Whereas a bundle of assistance that could strengthen long-term individual capacities such as capacity development, animal disease prevention, insurance, and assistance to returning residents, only got 4 percent combined shares.

LGUs' DRR interventions are reflective of an undifferentiated view of disaster impacts, neglecting the peculiar needs of vulnerable populations. Outputs of the Community Score Cards (CSC) reveal that rights holders have needs not covered in the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (LDRRM) plans prepared by duty bearers.

Combatting COVID-19 proved that Local Governments are capable of rapidly adjusting to crises with urgency. On average, 13.86 percent of 2019–2021 LDRRMF of sampled Provinces was used to combat COVID-19, a rate comparable to flood control projects within the same period. The Municipality of Dolores had spent 100 percent of its LDRRMF in 2020, while in the Municipality of Virac, LDRRMF underspending was lowest in five years at 10.3 percent.

Anticipatory actions (AA) are visibly part of the local DRR policy discourse, except pre-emptive cash transfers. The focus group discussion (FGD) reveals that anticipatory release of cash assistance is not yet possible in the absence of official guidelines from the National Government. Anticipatory Actions are those that can be done within the limited window of opportunity, that is, between the raising of the alarm and the actual onset of the calamity. FGDs confirmed that LGUs have implemented pre-emptive evacuation of people and livestock, called for early harvest of crops, and distributed food and non-food items in the face of imminent typhoons – but never cash.

Reforming the institutions governing the deliberations at the Local DRRM Councils could make a difference.

The case studies' experience in using the CSC in assessing LDRRM program implementation reveals that duty bearers and rights holders did not see eye-to-eye. Duty bearers are more concerned with internal processes, whereas rights holders see their reality grounded on the collective needs of the community, and the importance of social capital. The epistemic exposition has unveiled the divergence and convergence of risk ideation and solutions by local stakeholders. The CSC approach has exemplified what the GAR 2022 advocates for the two sectors to 'talk to each other and not in silos' (UNDRR, 2022, p. 15).

Descriptive in nature, this research employed a mixed methods approach. It reviewed secondary data from the General Appropriations Act (GAA 2016–2021), Department of the Interior and Local Government's (DILG) Financial Disclosure Portal (FDP 2019–2021), Department of Budget and Management's (DBM) Local Budget Memoranda (LBM 2016–2021), and the COA's Consolidated Annual Report of DRRM Fund (FY 2016–2020). The research also drew insights from the qualitative data obtained using the CSC with both local duty bearers and rights holders in LGUs Virac and Dolores as case studies.

Budget input tracking proved to be very challenging both at the national and local government levels. This is due to the fragmented data on DRRMF and its report of utilization from different official documents. This makes budget performance assessment difficult, let alone reform the way DRRM is implemented.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Disaster risks are intensifying as human actions generate greater and more dangerous risks than it attempts to reduce (UNDRR, 2022). This is the alarming conclusion of the Global Assessment Report (GAR) 2022, which underscores the reverse effects of current societal, political, and economic choices amidst the global commitment to building resilient communities and creating a sustainable development future. Poverty, inequality, and a rapidly deteriorating ecosystem remain the potent lingering drivers of change. But with climate change, global connectedness and the COVID-19 pandemic, humans are facing systemic risks that may push the entire human system to collapse. By systemic risk, the GAR 2022 emphasizes the cascading effects of a disaster episode, triggering a wave of other forms of disasters within volatile, complex and uncertain human systems. This re-conceptualization views risk not simply as the product of hazards and vulnerability, but something that entails interaction effects; or a disaster as a mere spectacle event, to one that is systemically anteceded by maldevelopment patterns and a series of human actions based on heuristics about disasters. For example, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement study found that of the 132 extreme weather events between January and September 2020, 90 occurred simultaneously with the COVID-19 pandemic, with ripple effects on food security, and social polarization. This systemic nature of risks has overburdened the already exhausted emergency funds of various states, and plunging some 150 million people into extreme poverty in 2021 (Eckstein *et al.*, 2021, p. 23). Also, the GAR 2022 observes a steady increase of disasters through the years. From the 2021 CRED-Emergency Event Data, GAR 2022 projects a 40 percent increase in annual global disasters in the next 15 years. In terms of drought, the projection is a more than 30 percent increase from an average of 16 droughts per year to 21 per year by 2030, while episodes of extreme temperature events are believed to triple by 2030, as current human decisions and actions will breach the global target of 1.5°C average maximum temperature increase by the early 2030s (UNDRR, 2022, p. 18).

Meanwhile, the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) ranked the Philippines as the fourth country most affected by extreme weather events from 2000 to 2019, next to Puerto Rico, Myanmar, and Haiti. Within a 20-year period, it was devastated by at least 317 extreme weather events resulting in an annual average of 859 deaths and \$3,179.12 million losses (Eckstein *et al.*, 2021, p. 13). The report further classifies countries in two broad categories: those that had experienced exceptional catastrophes such as Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and those that had experienced and are experiencing extreme weather events on an ongoing basis, such as the Philippines. The country's risk profile has led to a widening supply-demand gap for rice, and is projected to worsen prevalence of hunger by 17 percent in the next 30 years, thereby jeopardizing national food security (Exconde, 2018, p. 9; Rosegrant, *et al.*, 2015, p. 13, as cited in UNDRR, 2019).

The country's eastern provinces facing the Pacific Ocean are perennially prone to multiple climate-related hazards. In particular, Eastern Samar is at high risk of typhoons. This translates to a more than 20 percent probability of potentially damaging wind speeds in the area in the next 10 years. The province is also at high risk of urban floods, coastal floods, tsunamis, and volcano eruptions (ThinkHazard!, 2022b). In 2013, the 'eye' of Typhoon Haiyan passed through LGU Guiuan, Eastern Samar, which largely devastated the province. In terms of disaster risk resilience, Eastern Samar is ranked last among 81 provinces in the country (CMCI-DTI, 2021a). Meanwhile, in Catanduanes Province, a high level of risk of the same hazards is observed, except for

volcano eruptions as it is located 50 kilometers away from an active Mayon Volcano (ThinkHazard!, 2022a). In terms of disaster risk resilience, it is ranked 73rd among 81 provinces in the Philippines (CMCI-DTI, 2021b). These LGUs are assisted by the SHARPER Project led by Oxfam Pilipinas and supported on the ground by its two local implementing partners – People’s Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRRN) and Sentro para sa Ikaunlad ng Katutubong Agham at Teknolohiya (SIKAT). It aims to enhance disaster preparedness, response, and recovery capacities of the 32 highly vulnerable barangays in the two provinces towards enabling them to co-lead future post-disaster humanitarian and recovery actions with the local authorities and other actors. The project runs from October 2020 to September 2023.

This study looks into the disaster risk reduction and management in the Philippines, especially the budget performance of the LDRRMF provided for by Republic Act (RA) 10121 otherwise known as the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (PDRRM Act of 2012). While the Philippine Government cites budget constraints as being substantially addressed in building resilience, it also points to the local governments’ difficulty of raising funds to support early recovery efforts and towards the long haul (UNDRR, 2019, p. 17); whereas the COA detects a year-on-year underutilization of DRRM funds both at the National and Local Governments citing the ‘reactive type of disaster spending’, or cutting back expenditures for fear of DBM/COA disallowance (Commission on Audit, 2013, p. 32). In deconstructing this perennial problem of suboptimal use of DRRM funding, the study has tested the UNDRR’s suggested pathway of working ‘across silos and design consultation with affected people’ at the municipal level through a social accountability approach. The deliberate use of the Community Score Card (CSC) approach is a processual test to the observation of Medina-Guce and Galindes (2017, p. 63) about the quality of civil society organizations’ (CSO) capacities to negotiate and make meaningful engagement in Local Development Councils. Their study affirmed the existence of a number of gaps that can be addressed through improving citizens’ access to information, engaging in evidence-based policy making, and strengthening their negotiating capacity. In the process, duty bearers and rights holders engaged in genuine dialogue that greatly improved the substance of simple DRRM plans as it now contained both top-down and bottoms-up perspectives of DRR. The production of this improved plan comes in handy as LGUs are now in the process of drafting their Executive-Legislative Agenda where the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (LDRRMF), Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Annual Investment Plan (LDRRMAIP), and the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Financial Plan (LDRRMFP) must be anchored on. In the whole process, particular attention was given to the advancement of women’s strategic interests, and that of other vulnerable sectors. This is because gender-based discrimination occurs even during disasters. This could be in the form of non-provision of necessary gender-specific needs like reproductive health services; gender stereotyping that hinders women from availing of psychosocial services to address emotional trauma; or worse, gender-based violence (GBV). All these add up to the growing reproductive and productive responsibilities of women (and LGBT) in any disaster situation (Abarquez & Parreño, 2014, p. 13).

1.2. Objectives

In general, the study aims to review the DRRM policy in the country and how the LDRRM funds performed in the last six years. An inquiry into institutions surrounding the utilization of the LDRRMF was done using a social accountability approach to surface both the perspectives of the duty bearers and the rights holders in evaluating the fiscal performance of two LGUs – Virac and Dolores – as case studies.

Specifically, it aims to:

- 1.2.1. Review existing disaster risk reduction policies, reports, and other relevant literature, with particular focus on the inclusion of vulnerable communities and groups like women in DRR-related processes;
- 1.2.2. Report on the levels and patterns of utilization of the DRRM funds from FY 2016 to 2021 at the national and local levels and in the Strengthening Community Preparedness, Rapid Response and Recovery (SHARPER) Project partner municipalities of Dolores, Eastern Samar and Virac, Catanduanes;
- 1.2.3. Track the use of the said funds vis-à-vis the local governments' mandates of carrying out DRRM, responding to humanitarian emergencies, leading local recovery and rehabilitation efforts in the aftermath of small-scale disasters, and addressing the DRRM needs of the vulnerable sectors in the community;
- 1.2.4. Determine how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the allocation and utilization of local DRRM funds; and
- 1.2.5. Document how Community Score Card (CSC) approach can leverage the voices and choices of vulnerable populations at the community level.

1.3. Review of Related Literature

1.3.1. The evolving framework for, and concept of, disaster risk

Since the observance of the International Decade for Natural Disasters Reduction (1990–2000), three major global frameworks have guided the management of disaster risk. The first was the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World adopted at the World Conference on Natural Disasters Reduction in Yokohama, Japan on May 23–27, 1994. As the title suggests, the aim of the strategy and plan of action is 'to provide all vulnerable countries, in particular the developing countries, with the opportunity to achieve a safer world by the end of the 20th century and beyond' (United Nations, 1994, p. 3). It recognizes that the realization of Sustainable Development conceptualized at the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development conference hinges on the adoption of measures to reduce disaster loss; and that disasters and environmental degradation are closely interlinked as propounded by the UN Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (*ibid.*). The successor framework is the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) adopted in Hyogo, Japan on January 18–22, 2005. It aims to substantially 'reduce disaster loss in lives and social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries' (UNISDR, 2005, p. 3). It signaled the shift from disaster management (DM) to disaster risk reduction (DRR). It pioneered the provision of a detailed work plan for different sectors and actors to work on disaster risk reduction (Zhou *et al.*, 2014). Finally, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) was adopted at the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction on March 14–18, 2015 in Sendai, Japan. It underscores the need and urgency to produce a plan to succeed the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015 because 'disasters continue to undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development' (UNISDR, 2015, p. 11). Like the HFA, it aims to substantially reduce disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries. It intends to achieve these by preventing new and reduce existing disaster risk by strengthening community resilience (*ibid*, p. 9). It coincides with the promulgation of the Paris Agreement which aims to bind the 196 nations to limit global warming below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-

industrial levels by 2030 (UN Climate Change, 2022). This underscores the close link between climate change and the increasing hydro-meteorological related disaster risks.

Alongside these long-term shifts in global disaster frameworks was a corresponding evolution of the ideation of disaster risk. Hilhorst (2004, pp. 52–53) surveyed the evolution of risk as a concept. In the 1950s, a hazard-centered paradigm dominated the discourse influencing State policies and actions. In this paradigm, disasters were attributed to the natural geophysical processes. As a consequence, technocrats from the natural sciences dominate the discourse. Seismologists and geologists are considered thought leaders who aim to understand, measure, and predict the occurrence of these natural processes. Concomitant to this view, social scientists were prescribing certain behaviors in response to an early warning system. Three decades later, the hazard-centered paradigm slowly gave way to the social vulnerability paradigm of the social science discipline. The social science community stressed that as disasters involve people, livelihood, and other critical assets, disaster risk must be the future scenario when natural processes such as hydro-meteorological and geophysical phenomena are combined with social structural factors such as poverty, inequality, and power imbalance that make people vulnerable – hence the formula, Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability (Blakie, *et al.*, 1994 cited in Hilhorst 2004, p. 53). Later, in the 1990s, it was accepted that disaster risk is the future product of ‘mutuality’ between hazard and vulnerability, or the interaction effects of these two factors. In this view, humans are considered not just vulnerable to hazards, but are also the causes of these hazards because of their activities. The current discourse demystifies the ‘naturalness’ of disasters, hence, removing the term ‘natural disaster’ in the latest literature. The global community is one in declaring risk to be systemic, recognizing ‘the complexity and interaction of human, economic and political systems and the natural systems’ (UNDRR, 2019c).

1.3.2. The evolving disaster risk policy in the Philippines

The DRR policy in the Philippines took root from the war context. In 1941, President Manuel L. Quezon signed Executive Order (EO) No. 335 creating the National Emergency Commission and the Civilian Emergency Administration to plan and implement protection measures for the civilian population in times of emergency situations. The EO provided for the creation of the counterpart structures in the Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities in a form of a Committee (President of the Philippines, 1941a). This was reinforced by EO No. 337 issued in the same year outlining the rules and regulations in forming and training volunteer guards at the city and municipal level. The Volunteer Guards were tasked to (i) assist in the population in emergencies in times of flood, fire, typhoon, epidemics, air raids; (ii) maintenance of peace and order, safeguard public utilities, bridges and manufacturing plants engaged in essential industries; as well as (iii) suppression of espionage and sabotage (President of the Philippines, 1941b). After the War, RA 1190 of 1954 was enacted providing for civil defense in time of war and other national emergencies. It created the National Civil Defense Council (NCDC) tasked to plan and approve civil defense programs to be executed by the National Civil Defense Administrator (NCDA), which directly reported to the Office of the President. As its local counterpart, Local Civil Defense Organizations (LCDO) were created, headed by Governors and Mayors. Like its wartime predecessor policies, RA 1190 retained public safety and war-related emergencies and measures as a major theme. With the Cold War as its backdrop, local public institutions and private firms were encouraged to prepare their own plans for civil defense, particularly in times of war directly involving the Philippines. Mandated measures included a guard system, warning system, personnel shelter, fire-fighting facilities and procedures, exit and entry control, blackout control, among others. And for the first time, funding was mentioned to support civil defense programs. Section 6 of the said law provided for half a million appropriation pesos for the

operations of the NCDA, of which not more than 20 percent shall be spent on overhead and salaries; while expenses to support the LCDOs were left to the responsibilities of local governments concerned, with a promised access to national subsidy if necessary (Congress of the Philippines, 1954). In 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1566, which aimed at strengthening the Philippine Disaster Control, Capability and Establishing the National Program on Community Disaster Preparedness. It recognized the need for pre-disaster planning and community preparedness, as well as positive and precise disaster control action for rescue evacuation, relief, and rehabilitation (President of the Philippines, 1978b). Within the context of Martial Law, the disaster control and coordination of civil defense was handed over to the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) at the national level with the National Civil Defense Administrator as chief implementer. At the regional level, a Regional Disaster Coordinating Council was chaired by a Regional Commissioner designated by the President to coordinate and oversee disaster response-related activities. At the local level, a same coordinating council was mandated with Governors and Mayors as Chairmen, assisted by their respective Superintendents of the Integrated National Police as Vice-Chairmen and Action Officers. To fund the operations of the LDCCs, Sec. 9 of the said decree mandated local governments to use their annual local funds for preparedness, among others. This was on top of the 2 percent annual unappropriated lump sum for unforeseen expenditures due to calamities and other emergencies as provided for in PD 477, Sec. 27(e) (President of the Philippines, 1974). The effectivity of the Marcos-era decree continued onto the post-EDSA years. In 1991, Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 was passed into law and mandates the Provincial Social Welfare and Development Officer to be in the 'frontline of service delivery, particularly those which have to do with immediate relief during and assistance in the aftermath of man-made and natural disaster and natural calamities' (Congress of the Philippines, 1991, Sec. 438.4). Moreover, the law made mandatory the local budget appropriations for disaster-related activities and increased it to 5 percent of the annual local estimated income, usable only within the affected areas declared by the President to be under a state of calamity (*ibid.*, Sec. 342.d). This was later amended by RA 8185, which defined calamity as 'a state of extreme distress or misfortune, produced by some adverse circumstance or event or any great misfortune or cause or loss or misery caused by natural forces' (Congress of the Philippines, 1996). It specifies the usability of the 5 percent calamity fund to include relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and other works or services in connection with calamities. It also localized the approval of state of calamity through the local *Sanggunian* instead of the Office of the President. Finally, in 2009 after the onslaught of two successive Tropical Depressions Ondoy (Ketsana) and Pepeng (Parma), which devastated Metro Manila and Northern Luzon, Republic Act 10121 otherwise known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act was passed into law in 2010. The law installed a National DRMM Council Chaired by the Department of National Defense, assisted by four Vice-Chairpersons; the same structures are cascaded down to the regional level as well as to the Local Government Units. In terms of funding, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and 12 core Departments and a few Bureaus and Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) are provided for through a Special Provision in the GAA. For rapid response needs, the Quick Response Fund (QRF) lodged in core Department's Annual Budget is being used; while for recovery and building back better, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRMF) is being tapped. The NDRRMF may replenish the depleting QRF of key Departments, while savings from the regular budget of different Departments may be re-aligned to augment the depleting NDRRMF (Qian *et al.*, 2020, p. 21). At the local government level, the law retains the mandatory 5 percent of their estimated annual income now known as the LDRRMF. This is further apportioned into 70 percent for mitigation and prevention, and 30 percent for quick response and recovery (Congress of the Philippines, 2010).

It can be noted that the evolution of the DRR legal foundations reflects both the academic ideation of risk and later influenced by the three global frameworks on disaster risk. In the 1940s, risk was more associated with war, wherein the composition of the mandated functionaries largely involved the military and the police forces. Hence, prescribed actions included the suppression of espionage and sabotage; maintenance of peace and order; safeguarding public utilities, bridges and manufacturing plants engaged in essential industries; on top of assisting the population in emergencies in times of flood, fire, typhoon, epidemics, and air raids. Volunteer guards were also trained and mobilized as if typhoons and earthquakes are combatable similar to criminals and partisans of the time. Also, the use of term 'emergency' in the law's title also connotes the myopic view of risk as something that is fortuitous and is only a 'here and now' event. This thinking is consistent with the hazard-centric paradigm of risk in the 1950s earlier cited by Hilhorst (2004). The hazard of typhoons and other weather disturbances were conflated with disturbances to peace and security that may erupt at any point in time; and that people must be trained and mobilized on how to react to these emergencies and surmount the level of risk. The same can be said about RA 1190 of 1954, where expected behaviors included the establishment of a guard system, warning system, personnel shelter, fire-fighting facilities and procedures, exit and entry control, blackout control, among others. These standard prescribed civilian actions are not surprising, given the key policy actors within the institutional make-up of the NCCD and the NCDA. The top-down, chain-of-command style of disaster management continued to run through the Marcos years. The term 'disaster control' in PD 1566 assumed human powers capable of combating forces of nature. Hence, the institutional arrangements both at the national and local levels remained to have been dominated by military/police policy actors to formulate solutions and lead in implementing 'precise disaster control action for rescue evacuation, relief, and rehabilitation'. Again, the hazard of war or rebellion was at the heart of the policy that even if the term 'community preparedness' started to appear in the policy discourse, it remained to be a top-down practice where communities are simply taught certain prescribed behaviors as part of controlling disasters. A paradigm shift was observed in the first Aquino presidency where, through RA 7160, the local Social Welfare and Development Officer was mandated to be at the frontline during disasters. Although the NDCC remained to be led by the Department of National Defense, the direction at the local level veered away from the traditional military/police responsibility to civilian works for the protection of civilians themselves. The mandatory 5 percent calamity fund also reflects the thinking that disasters are collectively a perennial problem and not simply a contingency, although the emphasis remained to be on disaster relief. This re-framing of disasters as socially constructed phenomena unfolded alongside the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA) at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. Among the gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) dimensions identified and monitored to this day are the situation and contributions of women in the environmental conservation, protection and rehabilitation processes, and its impact to their risk resilience along with that of their children (Philippine Commission on Women, 2020). In the Philippines, this led to the enactment of RA 9710 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Women, where Rule IV, Section 13 provides for women's protection and security in times of disasters, calamities and other crisis situations especially in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts (Republic Act 9710 Otherwise Known as the Magna Carta of Women, 2008). Another positive development is the amendment to the 1991 law through RA 8185, which articulated 'rehabilitation and reconstruction' as part of disaster management, in addition to the 'relief' and 'community preparedness' terms espoused by its predecessor policies. Finally, by the time RA 10121 was enacted in 2010, the HFA was already mid-way in its lifetime. The discourse has largely shifted from disaster management to disaster risk management – in Hilhorst's (2004) theorizing: from a hazard-centered paradigm to a vulnerability-centered paradigm of risk. Hence, in the current DRR policy framework, 'form follows the function' in terms of the institutional arrangement both at the national and

local levels, where the DRRM Council is divided into four clusters reflecting the four thematic areas of DRR, namely, disaster mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster rehabilitation. In this paradigm and institutional arrangement, disasters are simply not thought of as a 'here and now', single-event spectacle, but as a socially constructed reality that development patterns must be informed by disaster prevention or mitigation, as well as institutional and community preparedness in order to cope with actual calamities and beyond. This is the rationale for apportioning the 5 percent LDRRMF to largely support prevention/mitigation and preparedness efforts with 70 percent of the funds, so as to lower the cost of response and rehabilitation using the remaining 30 percent.

To date, with the COVID-19 pandemic, the UNDRR is urging the international community to 'recognize that planetary and human systems are interdependent' (UNDRR, 2022), and that risk is no longer isolatable to one local area; that risk is now systemic so that one actualized risk in one locality can have butterfly effects to a 'network of risks' (*ibid.*, p. 143). This is made possible through increased global interconnectedness in human mobility, commodity supply chain, and communication. Such was the case of the Wuhan virus outbreak. Hence, with the shifting, yet again, of the ideation of risk, a corresponding change in our disaster risk governance should be in the offing. While systemic risk cannot be entirely removed, it can be reduced and addressed effectively. One of the UNDRR's clarion calls is for the reconfiguration of governance and financial systems 'to work across silos and design in consultation with affected people' (UNDRR, 2022, p. 15). This enjoins the DRRM community to approach disaster from a transdisciplinary perspective, veering away from a top-down direction; to look into a system of hazards and not just one particular hazard; and for disaster learnings to be built into plans and budget documents by both the government and communities. It also stressed the critical role of risk communication, which must reflect the systemic nature of risk and must be based on genuine dialogue to improve the understanding of risk, clarify unified intentions to act on these risks, and make use of collaborative intelligence in crafting plans to reduce these risks. With this changing idea of risk comes specific actions and institutions not found in the current menu of DRRM. Policy terms like risk transfers, anticipatory actions, as well as strengthening people's participation through increased social accountability approaches must now be built into our disaster risk governance.

1.3.3. Prevailing guidelines on DRRMF utilization

Since the enactment of RA 10121, a number of issuances from different Government Departments have been made, refining and reinforcing Section 21. The said provision is the main anchor of the LDRRM Fund, which provides for not less than 5 percent mandatory budget based on the estimated annual income of an LGU. The use of this funds must be laid down in an LDRRMP to be prepared by the LDRRM Office (LDRRMO) to be created pursuant to Section 12 of the same Act. Upon approval by the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMC), the plan shall be endorsed to the local *Sanggunian* to authorize the use of the budget. It shall also be incorporated in the Local Development Plan (LDP) for implementation by the Local Chief Executive. The law also provides for the bifurcation of funds into a 70-30 ratio. Disaster Mitigation/Prevention and Preparedness efforts shall be supported by 70 percent of the funds, while the 30 percent shall serve as a stand-by funds to be used during actual calamity for response and recovery (Congress of the Philippines, 2010). In 2012, the DILG Memorandum Circular (MC) introduced the National DRRM Plan as the framework for implementing the current DRRM Law. It also outlined what rescue and response equipment can be purchased using the 70 percent mitigation and preparedness funds (DILG, 2012). This is reinforced by a Joint Memorandum Circular (JMC) No. 01-2013 clarifying further the allocation and utilization of the LDRRMF (NDRRMC-DBM-DILG, 2013). In this JMC, the use of the 70 percent of funds extends to include disaster

response, recovery and rehabilitation (Item 4.0). It also specifies what projects and activities fall under each thematic area (Item 5.0). Moreover, the mechanics of funding appropriation and releases are clarified (Item 6.0) where, aside from preparation of the LDRRMP (three years), a Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Investment Plan (LDRRMIP) shall also be prepared and incorporated in the Annual Investment Plan (AIP) to serve as a year-on-year implementation blueprint; that the use of the 30 percent must be sanctioned by a declaration of State of Calamity by the local *Sanggunian*; that any unspent balances in a current year must accrue to a Special Trust Fund (STF) in the following year through the usual AIP revision and subsequent approval of a local appropriations Ordinance, usable for DRRM-related projects and activities within five years; and that a mandatory reporting of LGUs about LDRRMF utilization be made to the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (DRRMC), Office of Civil Defense (OCD), DBM, and DILG every month and annually. This reporting mechanism is further detailed in COA Circular 2012-002 where the LDRRMO is mandated to render a Report of Utilization to COA every 15th day of the month through the LDRRM Council and Local Development Council. The report must be certified by the LGU Accountant (5.1.5). The COA Circular also clarifies that only the unexpended balance of the LDRRM Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) shall accrue to an STF, while those for Capital Outlays (CO) shall be treated as continuing appropriations in the following year until the project is completed (Item 5.1.10). A fine-grained accounting, monitoring and reporting mechanism is further laid down by COA to all public accountants in the government regarding the use of the N/LDRRM Funds as well as cash/in-kind donations both from domestic and foreign donors (Commission on Audit, 2014).

1.3.4. DRRMF: Utilization and trends

The DRRMF performance in the Philippines is an irony of scarcity amidst plenty. From the government's perspective, LGUs, particularly cities, 'often face significant challenges in securing adequate resources for post-disaster operations, including rapid access to funding to support early recovery efforts' (UNDRR, 2019b, p. 18) – this, despite the mandatory 5 percent LDRRMF of every LGU, and access to NDRRMF when necessary, grants and loans from Official Development Assistance (ODA), and enrolment to market-based risk transfer instruments such as the Philippine City Disaster Insurance Pool, the Philippine Parametric Catastrophe Risk Insurance Program of the DOF, and the annual Php1 billion People's Survival Fund.

At the national level, DRR funding from the GAA is not fully utilized. Qian *et al.* (2020, p. 21–27) estimated the total post-disaster authorized allocations for release from FY 2015–2018 at Php384 billion, which included post-GAA adjustments. This is distributed as follows: NDRRMF (23.3 percent), QRF (5.3 percent), agency-specific (47 percent), National Government subsidies to GOCCs (13 percent), unprogrammed fund releases for post-disaster needs (6.5 percent), and augmentation to NDRRMF (4.3 percent). However, two major constraints were identified by the study: assessment of damages due to disasters is usually larger than budget appropriations for disaster assistance; and the lengthy process of approval for funding request, which is more than one year based on the post-Yolanda (Haiyan) experience. This resulted in the low uptake of the NDRRMF from as low as 1 percent in 2016 to only 64 percent in 2017. Other reasons cited for the low utilization report point to the LGUs' failure to properly report their utilization of the downloaded funds from the national government. On the other hand, the estimated QRF of the NGAs for 2015–2018 reached Php37.6 billion with an average utilization rate of 63 percent. A quarter of this, however, was implemented beyond 2018; and despite suboptimal utilization, some Departments request for replenishment every time their QRF is depleted by 50 percent. On top of this, some Php120 billion in loans from ODAs were also recorded (NEDA 2020 cited in Domingo & Manejar, 2021, p. 15).

The LDRMMF follows the same pattern as the NDRRMF. Domingo and Manejar (2021, pp. 17–19) found evidence of underutilization of the local DRRMF across the country. In their study using data from the DILG Financial Disclosure Portal (DILG-FDP) from 2015–2019, they found that while funds for mitigation and QRF are disbursed, the utilization for the 30 percent is “less profound”. They concluded that this sparse use is handicapped by the legal limitation in accessing it; and as these unspent balances are transferred to a Special Trust account in the following fiscal year, they also observed that both the trust fund and current appropriations were largely untouched, giving rise to accumulated funds year-on-year. The same pattern goes on for other DRR funding sources such as the NDRMMF, transfers from other LGUs, and international sources. Further insights from study reveal that while amounts for LDRRMF continue to rise, from 2012–2020 the utilization rate across these years had not reached 50 percent of the allocation itself (except for 2013 when Yolanda struck and the DRRMF utilization rate barely surpassed the underutilization rate). Yet, in their FGD rounds, reports of lack of funding were commonly raised as a reason for not attaining fully the DRRM outcomes. They, however, assumed that incomplete data in the DILG-FDP may have influenced the results of the analysis. Moreover, despite data incompleteness as contained in the COA reports, Qian *et al.* (2020, p. 38) produced estimates of the size of the regular appropriation for LDRRMF from 2015–2018 at Php91.4 billion distributed as follows: Provinces 23.3 percent, Cities 22.8 percent, Municipalities 34.1 percent, and Barangays 19.7 percent. In addition, some Php20.3 billion from Other Sources accrued to Provinces with Php4 billion, Cities with Php10.8 billion, and Municipalities with Php5.5 billion. However, some Php18.8 billion more were not accounted for in the annual COA reports due to the failure of some LGUs to submit reports to the Commission. In terms of utilization, the sampled year FY 2017–2018 was computed at 75 percent, which is higher than the Domingo and Manejar (2021) study, which used an eight-year panel data. But implementation pace was questionable such that COA flagged down some LGUs that failed to implement more than half of identified Programs, Projects, and Activities (PPA) in their LDRRMPs. In FY 2018 alone, COA was able to identify 16 LGUs with an implementation performance of about 25 percent. Improper use of the funds was also found to be occurring as 6 percent of LGUs have charged non-DRRM projects (e.g., Sanitary Landfill governed under RA 9003) or activities against the LDRRMF, while another 20 percent of LGUs did not properly report the use of funds. This slow pace of implementation accumulated some Php36.5 billion unspent LDRRMF. In FY 2018 alone, more than 50 percent was unspent at the year’s end.

Almost 10 years ago, COA had already sounded the alarm over the government’s DRR spending pattern characterized largely as reactive (more on response expenditure), insufficient, inefficient and for the most part, too slow. Especially at the LGU level, DRR spending is done with apprehensions of COA or DBM disallowances. This limiting factor renders the vulnerable population less prepared to cope with perennial calamities (Commission on Audit, 2013).

1.3.5. LDRRMF underutilization and vulnerability

Sub-optimal use of government funds and other resources bodes ill to the welfare of the public. PD 1455-1978, Section 2 provides: ‘It is the declared policy of the State that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguard against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government x x x ’ (President of the Philippines, 1978a). Hence, the COA annually raises this concern to the OCD-DND and LGUs in its Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM). Reduced spending can be construed as less presence of the government, which is found to negatively affect people’s vulnerability. Particularly, it heightens the vulnerability of children, the elderly, and persons with disability (PWD) (Tagalo, 2020).

Vulnerability of children. The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA, 2022) reports that as of May 2020, the population of children in the country is 44.5 million, with a youth dependency ratio of 48.1 percent. According to UNICEF Philippines, between 50 to 60 percent of the population affected by disasters are children. Their disaster experiences range from malnutrition, diseases, poor water sanitation, disruption of schooling, psychological stress, and loss of lives (UNICEF Philippines, 2018). In mitigating the impact of disasters on children, the Philippine Government enacted Republic Act 10821 or the Children's Emergency Relief and Protection Act of 2016. The new law mandates the establishment of a Comprehensive Emergency Program for Children (CEPC) to ensure that the 'fundamental rights of children are protected before, during, and after disasters and other emergency situations, and to facilitate the provision of life-saving humanitarian and protection assistance to vulnerable children in emergencies, especially separated children, children with disabilities, children in shelters' (Congress of the Philippines, 2016).

Vulnerability of persons with disability. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates around 1 billion people or 15 percent of global population having some forms of disability (DOH, 2023). In the Philippines, the latest report by the National Statistics Office (NSO) on the PWD population goes back to 2010 with around 1.443 million Filipinos or 15 percent of population experiencing long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments (*ibid.*). Fuji (2012 cited in Quail et al., 2018) concluded that people with physical disability are '2 to 4 times likely than the ordinary people to die or sustain injuries during disaster events'. Their ability to cope with actual disasters is limited not only by their physical impairment, but also by the poverty, lack of social support and prevailing structural exclusion. In the 2013 global survey among 5,717 respondents commissioned by UNISDR, it was found that 85.57 percent stated that 'they have not participated in community disaster management and risk reduction processes currently in place in their communities; 72.20 percent said that they do not have a personal preparedness plan in the event of a disaster; and that family support is the most important element to their disaster preparedness' (UNISDR, 2014, p. 2). For this reason, the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015–2030 outlines in Paragraph 7 the need for Governments to 'engage with relevant stakeholders, including women, children and youth, persons with disabilities, poor people, migrants, indigenous peoples, volunteers, the community of practitioners and older persons in the design and implementation policies, plans and standards' (UNISDR, 2015, p. 9). For Stough and Kang (2015), the SFDRR is a document that carries a pivotal shift in favor of persons with disabilities not found in the HFA: (i) it placed emphasis on inclusivity of disaster preparedness, response and mitigation activities; (ii) it underscores accessibility of technology and communication during disasters; and (iii) it recognizes the essential role of persons with disabilities and their advocacy organizations as stakeholders and collaborators in emergency planning and recovery (Stough & Kang, 2015, p. 146). In the Philippines, policies are in place protecting and upholding the rights of persons with disability, namely, Republic Act 7277 or The Magna Carta for Persons with Disability, which provides a clear and comprehensive input on the rights and privileges of persons with disability; BP 344 focusing on accessibility, RA 10070 that provides for the establishment of an institutional mechanism to ensure the implementation of programs and services for persons with disability, RA 9442 that grants various incentives to PWDs, and RA 10524 that promotes economic independence of the sector through employment and opportunities. However, despite the ample laws for their protection and needs mainstreaming, the PWD sector remains invisible in government DRRM plans as 'accurate information about persons with disability is still wanting, thereby serving as a source of their exclusion' (Manlapaz, 2019, p. 7).

Vulnerability of elderly people. HelpAge International (2019) reports that in 2015, there were about 901 million senior citizens across the globe, and this figure could more than double by the year 2050 (p. 12). In the

Philippines, about 15.07 million of the population as of 2020 were 60 years old and above. The country has an Old Dependency Ratio of 8.4 percent (PSA, 2022). Like the children population, the elderly's vulnerability to risk is heightened by their age-based frailty (Tagalo, 2020, p. 702). Their waning physical capacities, combined with institutional factors such as inadequate service provision, support and information for older people both in DRR planning and during emergencies, have made this sector very vulnerable to disasters. They are alluded to as 'living on the edge': socially, having no access to social services, and politically, as having minimal participation in decision making about their lives and means for survival (Formilleza, 2010, p. 4). Despite having rich experience, knowledge, and skills relevant to the local context, they still often get excluded from participating in the DRR. This marginalization has resulted in a large proportion of lives lost due to disasters as recorded in Hurricane Katrina (75 percent), the 2011 Tsunami in Japan (56 percent), and close to 40 percent during 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and the 2011 Earthquake in Nepal (HelpAge International, 2019, p. 30).

Vulnerability of women. In terms of GBV, the GAR 2022 report shows a significant positive correlation between GBV and being affected by disasters. At the extreme end, women fall victim to intentional homicide and trafficking (UNDRR, 2022). In the Philippines, 1 in 20 women and girls aged 15–49 years old fell victim to sexual violence per the report of the 2017 National Demographic and Health Survey (UNFPA, 2023). Brown *et al.* (2019, pp. 46–51) confirmed the worsening marginalization of women in-post disaster settings in Nepal, Malawi, and Dominica: elderly women and young girls are found to have increased workloads in the evacuation camps, gathering firewood and water for cooking; discrimination, particularly of the LGBTQI, has pushed individuals to hazardous coping strategies as they would rather stow away and wander the city streets than go to camps. For young girls, living in IDP camps has increased their vulnerability to sexual harassment and abuse due to lack of separate hygiene facilities, safe spaces for women, and lack of lighting in the camp facilities; and men's propensity for alcohol abuse. In some instances, these led to early marriages to escape their situations, or to child trafficking and transactional sex as part of coping mechanisms. In the long run, these have limited women's access to support in rebuilding their homes and livelihoods. With reduced capacities, and heightened discrimination to, for instance, owning land, women are trapped in the vicious cycle of poverty. In the Philippines, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Plan 2020–2030 calls for gender mainstreaming in DRR. It aims for a wider recognition, acceptance, identification and addressing the different roles, needs, capacities and vulnerabilities of men and women, and promoting gender-sensitive vulnerability and capacity analysis in all disaster risk reduction and management activities. In particular, women are encouraged to take active roles in DRR leadership, decision making and in the whole policy or project cycles. To succeed, women need to be afforded with opportunities to build their DRR knowledge and skills, change people's attitude towards gender imbalance, challenge belief systems unfavorable to women, and promote inclusive governance (NDRRMC, 2020, p. 45).

1.4. Framework

In unpacking the trend in LDRRMF utilization at the LGU level, the study is anchored on Section 1, Rule 18 of RA 10121 that defines the LDRRMF utilization. This is reinforced by JMC No. 01-2013 clarifying further the allocation and utilization of the LDRRMF. In this JMC, the use of the 70 percent of funds extends to include disaster response, recovery, and rehabilitation (Item 4.0).

The study also proceeded using the process and variables prescribed in the Community Score Card approach. The CSC is a social accountability approach where ordinary citizens are provided the mechanism through

which they can directly engage state actors as they exact change. For rights holders, the mechanism is designed to enable them to realize their entitlements, thereby improving the service provision of the state-actors in a structured and meaningful dialogue (Malena *et al.*, 2004, p. 7). The main variable reviewed is the objective inputs in the form of government records (approved budget, reports of utilization, audit observations). Another variable is the subjective assessments (score card) of policy performance separately deliberated by duty bearers and rights holders. In Hilhorst's (2004) theorizing, these two represent distinct social domains with distinct discursive practices, world views, and biases. Finally, the most critical variable is the epistemic exposition of the divergence and convergence of the two sectors' DRR problematization, and corresponding solutions according to their own ideation of risk. These are mapped out and harmonized in an interface deliberation and becomes the basis for plans of actions to sustain or improve further the policy implementation. The process is in consonance with UNDRR's call of action for state and non-state actors to work 'across silos and design consultation with affected people'.

1.5. Limitations of the Study

Government data on DRMM at large is found to be fragmented (Qian *et al.*, 2020; Domingo & Manejar, 2021). Different data come from different sources. For instance, the main dataset analyzed in the study is from the Annual COA Reports on DRRM utilization between the years 2016 and 2021. However, these reports have a few weaknesses as (i) they do not reflect budget modifications like augmentation, reallocation, or supplemental budgets that are happening within the implementation phase; and (ii) they do not include status reports on Barangay 5 percent LDRRMF utilization (Qian *et al.*, 2020, pp 38–40). To supplement, data from the DBM's Annual Budget Memoranda, as well as the DILG's Financial Disclosure Portal were used when available at different years. Nonetheless, these are found by the researchers to be more than sufficient to analyze past budget performance and project future spending patterns. The Municipalities chosen as case studies are part of Oxfam's SHARPER Project, in coordination with local NGOs SIKAT and PDRRN. Hence, caution is advised in generalizing the narratives synthesized in the two cases documented, acknowledging that these may not be representative of all LGUs, and that each community as a unit of analysis has peculiar realities that are valid only within their rhetorical spheres. Nevertheless, they provide the readers some snapshots that could well be improved and validated by others' experiences if given ample time to gather a wider database and generate new knowledge about the problem statement. Moreover, this study is not attempting to determine the impact of social accountability nor the presence of the SHARPER program on LDRRMF use.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Research design

The research is descriptive in design using a quantitative-qualitative research technique. Quantitative approach is employed to gain context at the national level, particularly in surfacing the trends in DRRM fund utilization. Qualitative analysis is used to understand local context that would assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of the quantitative study (Creswell, 2009, p. 211). Further, this is an action research designed to capture the nuances of change processes as they unfold through the workshops.

2.2. Sampling design

Quantitative Sample: The study employed two quantitative sampling frames. In the scoping phase, the sample was universal in the sense that the DRRM allocations of both the National Government Agencies (NGA) and Local Government Units (LGUs) were analyzed from the COA and DBM Annual Reports. Table 1 is the second sampling frame that looks into the expenditures level and patterns of LGUs ($n=41$) that were randomly selected from each tier and income class.

Table 1. LGU sampling frame

| Provinces | Cities | Municipalities |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Ilocos Norte | Quezon | Cainta |
| Rizal | Cagayan de Oro | Baganga |
| Cebu | Iloilo | Hilongos |
| Davao de Oro | Puerto Princesa | Hinatuan |
| Zamboanga Sibugay | Lucena | Mambajao |
| Eastern Samar | Naga, CamSur | Candelaria (ZA) |
| Ifugao | Calapan | Looc |
| Catanduanes | General Trias | Baleno |
| Marinduque | Dipolog | Basco |
| Dinagat islands | Mati | Adams |
| Batanes | Alaminos | San Benito |
| Siquijor | Bayugan | Guinsiliban |
| | Cauayan | |
| | Naga, Cebu | |
| | Roxas | |
| | Marawi | |
| | Escalante | |

Authors' compilation.

Qualitative Sample: Focus group discussions were conducted in two case study areas. One session was in Virac, Catanduanes (July 13–14, 2022), and another session in LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar (August 2–3, 2022). Both areas are SHARPER project partners and highly prone to typhoons. Each FGD session took two days to complete. Table 2 indicates the FGD participants. Primarily, it involved the members of the Local Finance Committee, LGU DRR functionaries, key National Government Agencies, and pertinent non-state actors.

Table 2. FGD sampling frame for 2 clusters (E. Samar and Catanduanes)

| Sector/Sub-sector | Dolores, E. Samar | Virac, Catanduanes | Invited/Agency/ Organization |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| • Local DRRM | 0 | 0 | Provincial DRRMO/Staff |
| | 1 | 1 | Municipal DRRMO/Staff |
| | 0 | 0 | GAD Focal Person |
| • Local Finance/ Birds and Awards Committee | 0 | 1 | Municipal Accountant/Staff |
| | 0 | 1 | Municipal Budget Officer/Staff |
| | 0 | 0 | Municipal General Services Officer/Staff |
| | 2 | 1 | Municipal Planning & Dev't Coordinator/Staff |
| | 1 | 1 | Municipal Social Welfare Office |
| • Key NGAs | 1 | 1 | DILG |
| • Non-state actors | 1 | 1 | Local women's organization |
| | 1 | 2 | Local children/youth organization |
| | 0 | 0 | Local organization for persons with disability |
| | 0 | 1 | Farmers' group |
| | 1 | 1 | Senior citizens' organization |
| Total participants | 8 | 11 | 19 overall participants |

2.3. Data collection methods

Desk review. In scoping for the DRRM policies in the Philippines, this study traced the history of government issuances in the country since the 1940s. It also consulted major documents from the UN on disaster risk, as well as surveyed the changing academic discourse on risk. The current consolidated reports of COA, the DBM, and the GAA were also major sources of data.






Community Score Card. The concept of social accountability is to provide ordinary citizens the mechanism where they can directly engage state actors as they exact change. This is done through developing relationships between non-state and state actors, where the entitlements of the former are realized by improving the service provision of the latter in a structured and meaningful dialogue (Malena *et al.*, 2004, p. 7). In the process, CSC promotes transparency, amplifies rights holders' voice, and increase duty bearers' responsiveness, which should lead to improved levels and quality of implementation.

The CSC process is divided into six steps: (i) input tracking, (ii) assessing the quality of inputs, (iii) generating benchmark performance criteria, (iv) comparing performance with other service providers, (v) generating direct feedback between service providers and end-users, and (vi) building local capacity, and strengthening citizen voice and community empowerment (Camargo & Stahl, 2016, p. 29). Critical to the process is the objective tracking of inputs based on public records or reports as anchors for the two LGU case studies. The impartial data source ensures that both the duty bearers and rights holders can have confidence in the objectivity of the report as a springboard for deeper discussions. From here, the two parties were grouped among themselves, and separately deliberated to further validate the findings in the input tracking. Each sector was encouraged to dissect the issue into specific sub-issues, elucidate on the nuances and context of the sub-issues, and develop indicators according to their sectoral points of view. The practice of providing space for each sector allows them to express their worldviews as understood from their own social domains (Hilhorst, 2004). In practice, CSC is a capacity-building approach in the sense

that it: (i) attempts to enhance people’s awareness of DRRM-related rights and available public programs and services; (ii) strengthens inclusive and systematic local public program assessment; and (iii) enhances skills in constructive but critical multi-stakeholder dialogue, which is the basis for a genuine accountability process that does not kowtow to the views and positions of those in power.

Using emotive icons, the group agreed on an emotive scale, instead of a numeric one to neutralize the intimidating effects of numbers. This practice reinforces the ‘casual’ proceedings so as not to alienate non-state actors who may not be used to the formal evaluation processes in governments and other formal institutions. The scale in Table 3 was used to gauge the status of the agreed indicators. Sensing deliberation saturation, the sectoral groups were once again brought back to a plenary presentation of outputs. The juxtaposition of worldviews enabled service providers and end-users to see convergence and divergence in inter-sectoral perceptions. This is a critical and sensitive juncture in the process when values were being surfaced and taken-for-granted assumptions about local realities are finally made explicit. The discussions spun off towards strengthening the areas of convergence, and planning for closing the gap through an action plan. This indicative roadmap towards improving DRRM service provisions should feed into formal planning workshops and documents within the LGU policy venues such the LDRRMC, the LDC, and the local *Sanggunian*.

Table 3. Emotive scale

| Emotive evaluation | Adjectival Description |
|---|------------------------|
|  | Very adequate |
|  | Adequate |
|  | Just enough |
|  | Inadequate |
|  | Very inadequate |

Ethical consideration. Before the workshops, FGD participants were requested to sign a consent form granting permission to the researchers to record the proceedings, take a picture of them, and use these materials as either references or directly cite these in quotation in the final report.

2.4. Data treatment tools

To ensure data validity, data obtained were triangulated using fundamental tools. Descriptive statistical tools were used to analyze past DRRM budget performance of sampled LGUs. In extracting the underutilization rate for each LGU, the authors deem it necessary to dissect the five percent LDRRMF into two fund sources pursuant to Section 1, Rule 18 of RA 10121 and JMC No. 01-2013. By these legal provisions, the 70 percent Mitigation/Preparedness funds have peculiar allowable spending rules and scope, distinct from the 30 percent Response/Rehabilitation funds.

Using the forecast function in MS Excel, the researchers were also able to project the five-year trend in the underutilization rate. In obtaining qualitative data, face-to-face FGD sessions following the CSC approach were conducted. In particular, CSC was used as a tool in surfacing values and assumptions among participants. Data from the CSC process were thematically analyzed based on the research questions and objectives.

3. FINDINGS

This section contains the results of the data analysis. Each sub-section corresponds to a specific objective outlined in sub-section 1.2.

3.1. Total DRRMF appropriations

This sub-section answers Objective 1.2.2. Table 4 presents the results of the scoping study for DRRM Funds in the past six years. Within the period, a total of Php334.43 billion was appropriated for DRRM PPAs (see Table 4). These data were assembled using the GAAs as references where the NDRRMF, QRF, and LDRRMF were captured. The Barangay LDRRMF stream was captured through DBM's Annual Local Budget Memoranda 2016–2021. This is done by estimating the 5 percent of the Barangays' Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). This dataset does not include the Annual People's Survival Funds, ODAs for Climate Change Adaptation (CCA)-DRRM, insurance for catastrophic risks, or LGU's other incomes on top of their annual IRA share.


Table 4. DRRM Funds Appropriation (in billion Php) by Funding Source, FY 2016–2021

| Source of Funds | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| NDRRMF | 38.90 | 15.76 | 19.60 | 20.00 | 16.00 | 20.00 | 130.26 |
| NGAs QRF | 6.22 | 3.0 | 7.60 | 6.27 | 6.80 | 6.37 | 36.26 |
| LGUs (Provincial, Cities, Municipalities, Barangays) | 21.43 | 24.34 | 26.14 | 28.78 | 32.45 | 34.77 | 167.91 |
| Total | 66.55 | 40.10 | 53.34 | 55.05 | 55.25 | 61.14 | 334.43 |

Source: GAA (FY 2016–2021); DBM Local Budget Memoranda for LGUs (FY 2016–2021). Authors' computation.

Figure 1 shows the variations in the DRRMF in the country in the past six years. The highest total appropriation was recorded in 2016 at Php66.55 billion, only to drop by more than Php20 billion in 2017. Onwards, it steadily bounced back almost at par to its 2016 level. However, LGUs are the consistent gainers as their LDRRMF grew steadily and peaked at Php34.77 billion in 2021; whereas the NDRRMF fell from its Php38.9 billion level in 2016 down by more than 50 percent in 2017. Since then, it never exceeded Php20 billion in the next four years. The QRF, on the other hand, ranged between Php3 billion in 2017 to as high as Php7.60 billion in 2018. It averaged Php6.23 billion in six years.

Figure 1. DRRMF Appropriation (in billion Php) by Funding Source, FY 2016–2021



Source: GAA FY 2016–2021 and Local Budget Memoranda (for BLGUs) FY 2016–2021. Authors' computation.


Table 5 shows the estimated 5 percent LDRRMF allocation based on LGUs' IRA shares from 2016 to 2021. In a span of six years, the total appropriation stood at Php167.91 billion or 51 percent of the total DRRMF in half a decade. Of this, Municipal LGUs got the lion's share at Php57.15 billion or 34 percent, the Provincial and City LGUs got almost equal shares at Php33.5–.8 billion or 23 percent, while Barangay LGUs got Php33.39 billion or 20 percent share. Year-on-year, the LDRRMF steadily grew from Php21.43 billion in 2016 to as high as Php34.77 billion in 2021. Figure 2 illustrates the overall steady growth of the LDRRMF.

Table 5. Estimated LDRRMF (in billion Php) Allocations from LGUs' IRA Shares, FY 2016–21

| LGU Level | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Provinces | 5.00 | 5.67 | 6.08 | 6.62 | 7.46 | 9.00 | 38.82 |
| Cities | 4.91 | 5.58 | 5.99 | 6.62 | 7.46 | 8.00 | 38.55 |
| Municipalities | 7.31 | 8.30 | 8.91 | 9.78 | 11.03 | 11.82 | 57.15 |
| Barangays | 4.22 | 4.80 | 5.16 | 5.76 | 6.49 | 6.96 | 33.39 |
| Total | 21.43 | 24.34 | 26.14 | 28.78 | 32.45 | 34.77 | 167.91 |

Source: DBM Local Budget Memoranda, 2016–2021. Authors' computation.

Figure 2. Distribution of LDRRMF (in billion Php) per LGU Tier, FY 2016–2021



Source: DBM Local Budget Memoranda FY 2016–2021. Authors' computation.

3.2. DRRMF allotment and utilization trends

Presented in this section is the DRRMF allotment and its utilization indicated in COA Reports from 2016–2020. Take note that this utilization trend refers to the expenditures based on what was released by DBM as an Allotment, not on what was approved by Congress as an Appropriation contained in the GAA (see Box 1 for distinction). NDRRMF appropriations and NGA's QRF replenishment are released upon approved request by concerned agencies through DBM's Special Allotment Release Order (SARO). This means that not all approved appropriations could be accessed, let alone utilized, without an approved request for allotment. The same is true in the case of LDRRMF where the Local Budget Office will have to release the Allotment before any Department could use the Appropriations approved by the local *Sanggunian*. Note also that this does not include donations received by the government for DRRM projects/programs. Meanwhile, LDRRMF utilization is based on the reported receipt of the prescribed 5 percent allocation from estimated regular sources of revenues of LGUs (see Table 5).

Box 1. Budget tools

Allotment - an authorization issued by the DBM to an implementing agency to incur obligations for specified amounts contained in a legislative appropriation.

Appropriation - an authorization made by law or legislative enactment directing payment out of government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes.

General Appropriations Act (GAA) - annual expenditure program of the national government and all of its instrumentalities. The expenditure program includes all programs and projects that are supposed to be funded out of government funds for the year.

Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) - A specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated.

See: <https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/BESF/BESF2022/GLOSSARY>.

Table 6. Yearly Appropriation, Allotment, and Continuing Appropriations (in Php billions) for NDRRMF, QRF and Other Special Provisions in the GAA 2016–2020


| | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Total | % to Total |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|------------|
| Approved Appropriations (With augmentations) | 45.12 | 18.76 | 30.10 | 26.3 | 29.60 | 149.88 | |
| Allotment Released by DBM (With augmentations) | 13.12 | 18.46 | 29.37 | 26.05 | 24.46 | 111.46 | 74% |
| Continuing Appropriations (Unreleased) | 32.00 | 0.30 | 0.73 | 0.25 | 5.14 | 38.42 | 26% |

Sources: GAA 2016–2020; COA Reports (in Php billions). Authors' computations.

Table 6 shows the total DRRMF in 2016–2020 distributed as either appropriated, allotted, and continuing appropriations (unreleased). In the five-year period, the total approved General Appropriations for DRRMF with mid-year adjustments reached Php149.88 billion, whereas the allotment released stood at 74 percent, leaving an unreleased DRRMF of 26 percent or Php38.42 billion. Meanwhile, the total LDRRMF release stood at Php230.07 billion within the same five-year period. Php106.12 billion (46 percent) of this was utilized, leaving a balance of Php123.95 billion (54 percent) in 2020. The COA consolidated report for LDRRMF did not reflect figures in FY 2016 (see Annex A).


Figure 3 illustrates the U-shaped DRRMF allotment utilization rate in five years. In 2016, the overall utilization rate was 51 percent. It dipped by around 20 percentage points in 2019, only to resurge in 2020 at 47 percent. In terms of funding source, both the NDRRMF and QRF exhibited a downward utilization trend, although the QRF's was more pronounced. It bounced back in 2020 when the QRF utilization rate leaped more than twice the preceding year. However, the LDRRMF's use continued to rise since 2017, peaking at 61 percent in 2020.

Figure 3. Trends in DRRMF Allotment and Utilization (in billion Php), 2016–2020



Source: COA Consolidated Report on the Audit of DRRMF FY 2016–2020. Authors' computation.


Figure 4. Trends in NDRRMF Allotment and Utilization (in billions Php), 2016–2020



Source: COA Consolidated Report on the Audit of DRRMF FY 2016–2020. Authors' computation.


Figure 4 shows the widening gap between the approved NDRRMF allotment and its utilization in five years. While allotment steeply increased through the years from Php5 billion in 2016 up to Php51 billion in 2020, expenditures, on the other hand, hardly increased beyond Php11 billion in 2020. This incurred a five-year accumulation of unspent NDRRMF of about Php100.49 billion or 88 percent of the total NDRRMF in half a decade. On the other hand, Figure 5 shows the utilization of the QRF in five years. It exhibits a same pattern as the NDRRM, except in 2020 when QRF expenditures exceeded unspent proportion by about 6.73 percentage points. Nonetheless, the accumulated unspent QRF still stood at Php50.43 billion in 2020 or 61 percent of the accumulated QRF in five years.

Figure 5. Trends in NGA QRF Allotment and Utilization (in billions Php), 2016–2020



Source: COA Consolidated Report on the Audit of DRRMF FY 2016–2020. Authors' computation.

Figure 6. Trends in LDRRMF Allotment and Utilization (in billion Php), 2016–2020



Source: COA Consolidated Report on the Audit of DRRMF, FY 2016–2020. Authors' computation.

Figure 6 illustrates the LDRRMF allotment and utilization in five years. In 2016, the COA Annual Report contained no data for LDRRMF. Like NDRRMF, local DRRM funds exhibited an exponential growth from as low as Php39.38 billion in 2018 to as high as Php81.59 billion in 2020. Utilization follows a same pattern, albeit lower by around 50 percent in absolute value. The lowest utilization posted was Php14.19 billion in 2018, while the highest expenditure was approximately Php50 billion in 2020. However, just like the preceding sources of funds, the allotted LDRRMF underutilization is still glaring, posting a five-year nominal accumulation of unspent funds amounting to Php123.95 billion or 54 percent of the total LDRRMF Allotment in five years.

Overall, underutilization was examined from two sources. Table 7 shows the indicative distribution:

Table 7. Estimated Unspent DRRMF (in Php billions), 2016–2020

| Fund Sources | FY 2016–2020 | Remarks |
|---|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| i. GAA Continuing Appropriations (unreleased) | 38.42B* | Subject to request/approved SARO |
| ii. Unspent Allotment | 80.02B** | Annual Allotment with adjustments |
| Total | 118.44 | |

* GAA, 2016–2020; ** COA Reports on Receipts and Utilization, 2016–2020. Authors' computation.

3.3. LDRRMF utilization in sampled LGUs

Table 8 shows the average rate of underspending of LGUs from 2017 to 2021. On average, LGUs failed to spend 50 percent of their LDRRMF in five years. The Provinces have the highest underspending at 58 percent. Moreover, the Cities underspent about 45 percent, while Municipalities' underspending is about 48 percent. This, however, could be affected by the sampling size per tier.

Table 8. Mean Rate of LDRRMF Underspending per LGU Tier, 2017–2021

| LGU Tier | Mean | N | Std. Deviation |
|----------------|--------------|-----------|----------------|
| Provinces | .5829 | 12 | .15489 |
| Cities | .4575 | 17 | .14580 |
| Municipalities | .4823 | 12 | .16247 |
| Total | .5014 | 41 | .15900 |

Authors' computation.

Table 9 indicates the mean rate of underspending in five years by Fund Source. On average, LGUs are not utilizing their 70 percent Mitigation/Preparedness funds twice as much as their 30 percent QRF, where the latter stood at 17 percent. Conversely, this means that QRFs are mostly utilized by LGUs, reminiscent of the COA findings pointing to LGUs spending pattern as 'reactive' (Commission on Audit, 2013, p. 32).


Table 9. Mean Rate of LDRRMF Underspending per Funding Source, 2017–2021

| | N | Min | Max | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|------------------------------|----|-----|-----|-------|----------------|
| 70% Mitigation/ Preparedness | 41 | .09 | .60 | .3283 | .13169 |
| 30% Quick Response Fund | 41 | .06 | .29 | .1731 | .05401 |

Authors' computation.


Figure 7 illustrates the indicative distribution of LDRRMF expenditures of sampled Provincial LGUs. As expected, Mitigation/Prevention (42.20 percent) expenses combined with Preparedness (21.15 percent) got the huge share as mandated by law. While Response (32.37 percent) and Recovery/Rehabilitation (4.27 percent) expenses are supposed to be within the 30 percent threshold for QRF. At a glance, this spending pattern seems compliant to the JMC No. 01–2013 mandating a 70 percent–30 percent budget allocation, but the year-on-year underspending trend says otherwise. Moreover, as RA 10121 allows for continuing appropriation for unimplemented/unfinished Capital Outlays, and re-appropriation for unspent MOOE as STF for the following year (5 years before reverting to the LGU General Fund), weak resiliency is constantly carried over onto succeeding years.

Figure 7. Expenditure Structure of LDRRMF in Sampled Provinces per DRR Thematic Area



Source: DILG Financial Disclosure Portal, 2019–2021. Authors' compilation/computation.

Figure 8. Particulars of LDRRMF Expenses Among Sampled Provinces, 2019–2021




Source: DILG Financial Disclosure Portal, 2019–2021. Authors' compilation/computation.

Figure 8 enumerates the common expenses of Provincial LGUs using their LDRRMF. Although Mitigation/Prevention projects and activities are implemented by the Provincial LGUs, these expenses are skewed toward infrastructure projects. This bundle of expenditures topped the list with 30.16 percent combined shares. This is comprised of road rehabilitation, evacuation center construction, flood control, farm reservoir, among others. Next are Response-related expenses to combat the COVID-19 pandemic with combined shares of 28.34 percent. Welfare goods for distribution, emergency cash assistance and other similar forms of government Response interventions have a combined share of 16.12 percent, while Preparedness-related expenses such as acquisition of rescue equipment and machineries as well as logistics purchases stood at 7.56 percent; whereas a bundle of assistance that could strengthen long-term individual capacities such as capacity development, animal disease prevention, insurance, and assistance to returning residents only got 4 percent combined shares.

3.4. Plausible utilization pattern in the next five years

Figure 9 shows the Annual Mean Rate of LDRRMF Underspending per Funding Source from 2017 to 2021. The graph shows a downward trend in underspending in the past five years. The 70 percent Mitigation/Prevention fund demonstrates a smooth deceleration from its peak of 41 percent in 2017 down to barely 30 percent in 2021. This smooth flow indicates a slow progress in utilization. On the other hand, the underspending rate of the 30 percent QRF took a deep dive between 2019 and 2020 when COVID-19 was at its peak. In five years, underspending dropped sharply by 15 percentage points from its 25 percent level in 2017 down to 10 percent in 2021. This means that LGUs were using the QRF more, indicating again its 'reactive' attitude towards disaster risk.


Figure 9. Annual Mean Rate of LDRRMF Underutilization per Fund Source, 2017–2021



Source: Authors' computation.

Figure 10 shows both the five-year historical data on LDRRMF underspending and the forecast for the next five years, other things being equal. Both the 70 percent Mitigation/Prevention funds and the 30 percent QRF show continuous deceleration with the former ebbing at 11 percent in 2026, while the latter is supposed to approach zero percent in 2022 to pass the negative mark onwards. The data, however, pertain to the annual allocation and utilization. It does not factor in mid-year adjustments to the budget such as augmentation (transfer of funds from one account to another within the DRR program) or supplemental budget (transfer of the previous year's unspent funds from current funds to Special Trust Funds). These decelerations, however, imply lesser accumulation of unspent funds, especially from the M00E component of the 70 percent pre-disaster allocation.

Figure 10. Projected Annual Mean Rate of LDRRMF Underutilization per Fund Source, 2022–2026



Source: Authors' computation.

3.5. Case Studies: Virac and Dolores

The country's eastern provinces facing the Pacific Ocean are perennially prone to multiple climate-related hazards. In particular, Eastern Samar is at high risk of typhoons. This translates to a more than 20 percent probability of potentially damaging wind speeds in the area in the next 10 years. The province is also at high risk of urban floods, coastal floods, tsunamis, and volcano eruptions (ThinkHazard!, 2022b). In 2013, the 'eye' of Typhoon Haiyan passed through LGU Guiuan, Eastern Samar, which devastated a large swathe of the province, including the LGUs of Salcedo, Balangiga, Lawaan, Quinapondan, and Dolores, among others. In terms of disaster risk resilience, Eastern Samar is ranked last among 81 provinces in the country (CMCI-DTI, 2021a). Meanwhile, in Catanduanes Province, particularly its capital city, Virac, a high level of risk of the same hazards is observed, except for volcano eruptions as it is located 50 kilometers away from an active Mayon Volcano (ThinkHazard!, 2022a). In terms of disaster risk resilience, it is ranked 73rd among 81 provinces in the Philippines (CMCI-DTI, 2021b).


Table 10 shows the rate of underutilization of the LDRRMF in five municipalities in Eastern Samar and one LGU from Catanduanes Province assisted by the Oxfam-led SHARPER Project from 2017–2021. Common to all was the decreasing trend in underutilization, except in 2021 when a resurgence was observed. LGU Lawaan consistently decreased its underspending even in 2021, posting a five-year average of 22.4 percent, the lowest among the SHARPER areas. However, the decrease in underutilization is much slower in LGU Balangiga. Data show that this fund source is largely idle to a large extent in that area, with a 62 percent average rate in five years; the highest recorded underspending was 92.4 percent in 2018. As reported by COA, some LGUs failed to submit utilization reports for certain years. Among these are Lawaan and Virac in 2018. Dolores failed to do so in 2017, but recorded zero underutilization in 2020.

Table 10. Rate of LDRRMF Underutilization in 6 SHARPER Project Areas, 2017–2021

| LGU | Mean Underutilization (%) | | | | | |
|-------------|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|----------------|
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 5-year Average |
| Salcedo | 38.7 | 66.9 | 21.3 | 14.8 | 20.5 | 32.4 |
| Balangiga | 76.4 | 92.4 | 50.0 | 42.7 | 48.3 | 62.0 |
| Lawaan | 61.9 | 0* | 28.3 | 17.6 | 4.4 | 22.4 |
| Quinapondan | 56.0 | 42.7 | 31.2 | 13.8 | 19.9 | 32.7 |
| Dolores | 0* | 78.8 | 45.2 | 0 | 13.3 | 27.5 |
| Virac | 50.4 | 0* | 18.9 | 10.3 | 58.9 | 27.7 |


*no data. Source: COA Consolidated Report on the Audit of DRRMF, FY 2017–2020. Authors' computation.

Figure 11. Annual LDRRMF and Rate of Underutilization, LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar, 2017–2021




Source: COA Annual Reports. Authors' compilation/computation.

Figure 12. Particulars of LDRRMF Expenses, LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar, 2019–2021.




Source: DILG Financial Disclosure Portal. Authors' compilation/computation.

Figure 13. Annual LDRRMF and Rate of Underutilization, LGU Virac, Catanduanes, 2017–2021



Source: COA Annual Reports. Authors' compilation/computation.

Figure 14. Particulars of LDRRMF Expenses, LGU Virac, Catanduanes, 2019–2021



Source: DILG Financial Disclosure Portal. Authors' compilation/computation.

Meanwhile, in the two SHARPER project areas of Virac and Dolores, LDRRMF underutilization is evident. Figure 11 illustrates the LDRRMF budget stream and corresponding underspending rate from 2017 to 2021 of LGU Dolores. In five years, total LDRRMF amounted to Php48.6 million (excluding the accumulated unspent funds not reflected in COA Annual Reports), where the average underspending rate stood at 27.5 percent. Underspending peaked at 78.8 percent in 2018, to as low as zero percent in 2017 and 2020. The spending structure of the LGU prioritized the installation of COVID-19 facilities and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), rescue equipment, drugs, medicines, among others. This disaster preparedness/response allocation is more than 50 percent of its total LDRRMF, with no mention of infrastructure projects for mitigation purposes (see Figure 11). On the other hand, Figure 13 shows the LDRRMF and the ratio of unspent funds from 2017 to 2021 in LGU Virac. In five years, the total LDRRM Funds reached Php110.3 million (excluding the accumulated unspent funds not reflected in COA Annual Reports), where the average underutilization rate stood at 27.7 percent verisimilar to LGU Dolores. Underspending peaked at 58.1 percent in 2021, or almost five times higher than in 2020 when COVID-19 was at its height. In 2018, no data were observed by COA. In terms of spending, medicines and stockpiling of food were allocated the highest budget proportion, followed by the operation of an Emergency Operations Center and procurement of rescue equipment. Infrastructure projects for mitigation purposes were allocated 11.51 percent comprised of flood control projects, construction of sea wall, and completion of evacuation centers.

Overall, it can be noted that these expenditures structures (from sampled Provinces and two SHARPER project areas) did not specifically mention any projects pertaining to the needs of the most vulnerable populations such as pregnant women, children, PWDs, or elderly people. This is indicative of an undifferentiated view of LGUs to the impact of disasters over the population.

4. DISCUSSION ON KEY FINDINGS

This section corresponds to the Objectives outlined sub-section 1.2. It discusses the policy and institutional factors that facilitated or constrained the utilization of DRRMF, especially at the local government levels. Special attention is given to two Oxfam SHARPER project areas, namely, Virac in Catanduanes Province and Dolores in Eastern Samar Province.

Key finding 1. While the LDRRMF is increasing from 2016 to 2021, suboptimal use is also evident especially in the use of the 70 percent mitigation/prevention fund. Figure 10 gives us an idea that pre-disaster underspending (70 percent mitigation fund) will continue, although it may decrease annually from an average of 41 percent in 2017 to around 11 percent in 2026, whereas the annual 30 percent QRF is found to be insufficient by 2025. These trends imply that underutilization will persist, mainly from the 70 percent mitigation fund. This underspending does not sit well with the increasingly alarming global disaster projections articulated in GAR 2022. The continuous negative drop of the 30 percent QRF underutilization illustrated in Figure 10 supports the global disaster foresight. Given this, it is imperative for the National Government and LGUs to pursue a no-regret investment to halt, if not reverse, the loss of previous development gains.

COA's annual AOM is replete with observations pointing to a chain of delays from plan submission to liquidation of funds leading to the burgeoning of unspent funds. At the national level, common causes of delays include: (i) the confusion by some NGAs as to what can be charged against the QRF, (ii) non-utilization of DRRMF because of lack of takers and difficulty of documents compliance, resulting in (iii) DRRM fund expiration, (iv) no/improper inventory/recording/ documents, (v) charging of non-DRRM related expenditures, (vi) unauthorized disbursement, (vii) non-preparation or submission of DRRM plans, (viii) failure to create policy guidelines on how to utilize the funds, and (ix) wastage of goods for distribution. In particular, sources of delays include the late releases of SARO, the delay in the conduct of detailed engineering design, the scarcity of construction materials in the market, the delay in the distribution of cash assistance, the delay in the delivery of non-food items, the delay in the procurement process, and the delay in the preparation and approval of annual investment plans.

The same delays are observed at the LGU level. In Virac, the COA noted the late approval of the 2016 Annual Budget, which caused domino effects on LDRRMAIP implementation. The delay in the approval of the Annual Budget still happened notwithstanding RA 7160, Sec. 318, which criminalizes any failure to submit proposed budgets to the *Sanggunian* beyond October 16th of every year; and Section 319, which mandates the *Sanggunian* to enact an ordinance authorizing an annual budget on or before the end of every fiscal year. Annually, from 2016 to 2019, less than 50 percent of authorized PPAs were not implemented by LGU Virac. COA cites the 'lack of spirit of decisiveness', and 'inadequate monitoring of project implementation'. The COA also pointed out the dual functions of their LDRRMO, which also serves as Municipal Tourism Officer. In the FGD conducted, the duty bearers confirmed the shortcoming of not establishing regular implementation tracking as mandated by COA. In terms of procurement delays, duty bearers also confirmed poor planning, having failed to specify in the Procurement Planning Management Plan (PPMP) items to be purchased under Capital Outlays. This is preceded by the absence of a market study indicating how much the prevailing market price is, so that purchase requests could have been backed up by sufficient funds. Underestimation of unit prices usually results in consistent failed biddings. In 2017, the LGU had an accumulated unspent amount of Php12.76 million, which was idle as it lacked a supplemental investment plan. Meanwhile, in LGU

Dolores, underspending was also found to be due to delays in the approval of the LGU Annual Budget where the LDRRMP is embedded. In the FGD, it was found that the delays were due to the delayed concurrence of the provincial *Sanggunian* to the Annual Budget approved and submitted by the Municipality. This renders the municipal-approved document inoperative.¹

Henceforth, the declaration of savings of the unspent funds in the preceding year and creating a Special Trust Fund thereof, which should have taken place every first quarter of the current fiscal year, was moved to the second quarter. Only then did procurement commence, which also took months before the actual acquisition of goods; and when the items arrived, it shall have been around the season for closing of accounting books, leaving a very limited time period for implementation. Other than slow budget proceedings, the lack of support from the Provincial DRRM Office was observed in terms of plan content. The municipal duty bearers report that the Provincial DRRM Plan does not include interventions identified in their Municipal LDRRMP. Another largely unimplemented PPA relates to capability building. According to the LGU duty bearers, their capacity-building program was put on hold since 2019 due to the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) restriction on people's movements. For a remote LGU like Dolores, online meetings and training are impossible given the weak internet signals. Other than delays in plan preparation, authorization, and implementation, the paucity and frequent change of personnel in the LDRRMOs were also cited by COA and affirmed by LGU duty bearers as a major factor that defined the level and pace of LDRRMF utilization. On top of these is the apparent standing of DRRM among other priorities of the local Chief Executive – from a clear indication of not filling up mandatory plantilla personnel for DRRM pursuant to RA 10121 Section 12 and Item 2.b of JMC No.1-2014, to as subtle as foregoing scheduled LDRRM activities in the communities. It is not surprising that COA's comment in the Notes to Financial Statement alludes to LGU Dolores as 'lenient' in terms of monitoring the utilization of LDRRM funds.

Moreover, it is worth repeating here that the accumulated spending pattern of sample Provincial LGUs, for instance, is apparently in conformity to the JMC No. 01-2013 mandating a 70 percent - 30 percent budget allocation for Mitigation/Prevention and Response/Rehabilitation, respectively, but the 'reactive' policy implementation comes in the form of 'belated' Mitigation/Prevention PPA implementation relative to the year it is supposed to be implemented. As a result, the weak build-up of resiliency is constantly carried over onto succeeding years, only to be interrupted by perennial calamities, if not disasters.

Key finding 2. LGUs are responding to the general welfare needs of its constituents, but its programs are reflective of its undifferentiated view of disaster impacts. Outputs of the Community Score Cards reveal that rights holders have needs not covered in the previous LDRRM plans prepared by duty bearers. The LDRRMF expenditure structure of sampled Provinces (see Figure 8 and of both Virac and Dolores (see Figures 12 and 14) reveal that LGUs are implementing programs and projects relating to disaster risk mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. However, when rights holders raised their issues confronting them at the disaster front, an apparent incongruence emerged. For instance, at the Virac interface meeting, only 3 out of 12 observations were mutually surfaced by the duty bearers and rights holders, although their subjective assessments did not correspond. For the duty bearers, the availability of DRR equipment, supplies, kits, and non-food essentials is considered just enough, but rights holders view this as inadequate; both agree that the

¹The MDRRMO and DILG contested this during the CSC. As advised by COA, the MDRRMO held that in the absence of the concurrence of the higher *Sanggunian*, all activities shall be put on hold; whereas DILG held that the authorization of the municipal *Sanggunian* is sufficient to implement PPAs, and only portions of it shall be declared inoperative should the higher *Sanggunian* deems it improper.

disbursement of capacity-building funds or the continuity of the community-level capacity building program is inadequate at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic; finally, both agree that a needs-based targeting system in a post-disaster setting to access livelihood support is very inadequate in their LGU.

'We are saddened by the information that the budget allocation for livelihood in 2020 was not implemented because the Local Government does not have a list of beneficiaries.'

(FGD youth participant, Virac)

On the other hand, there were observations when duty bearers and rights holders did not see eye-to-eye. Duty bearers are inward-looking and process-oriented. For them, a successful DRR also involves the timely submission of procumbent plans, regular monitoring of PPAs, the improved level of understanding of end-users on account codes as prescribed by COA, and the presence of evacuation centers; whereas rights holders view a successful DRR if there is a robust community-based monitoring system that could enable a functional rapid pre- and post-disaster needs assessment visiting their communities:

Rights holders: *'RDNA is not so effective in giving out accurate disaster information. The Barangay Health Workers tasked to do the data gathering do not have enough training to carry out the task. They produce varying interpretations of gathered data. It's more for compliance than producing reliable data. It may be the effect of unsustained capacity building.'*

Duty bearers: *'During TY Rolly, Virac had the highest number of reports submitted. We have two RDNA teams. We followed the prescribed hours in issuing updates. But our LDRRMO had difficulty in getting accurate data because the Barangay functionaries were included in the list, even those not affected by the calamity.'*

Moreover, rights holders also observed the absence of hygiene essentials in the emergency kits distributed by the LGU, and the lack of gender-sensitive and child-friendly spaces during evacuations:

Rights holders: *'Our evacuation areas do not have dividers to protect the privacy of women and their children.'*

Duty bearers: *'There are spaces for children, although this is not adequate for all evacuees. We also have a couples' room and breastfeeding rooms. The real issue is the inadequacy of the evacuation center.'*

Rights holders attribute these deficiencies relative to their needs to the lack of meaningful representation of vulnerable sectors in the LDRRMC that could have enabled them to give inputs in the entire project cycle:

'They're just around, sitting (CSO representatives), but are not able to speak.'

(FGD youth participant, Virac)

This is confirmed by the duty bearers:

'CSOs are represented in the LDRRMC. But they seldom speak during meetings. We are planning to update our CSO accreditation process since the sitting CSOs have been there in the Council long before I came to DRRM Office.'

(FGD DRRMO participant, Virac).

Meanwhile, the Dolores leg of the research revealed a scarcer correspondence between duty bearers and rights holders. Both perspectives saw the level of participation of community people in DRR activities as either inadequate or very inadequate; both also saw the availability of evacuation sites to be an important success indicator. Similar to the Virac observations, evacuation facilities are said to be not gender-sensitive:

Rights holders: *'Our usual evacuation site is the plaza or covered court. But it lacked restrooms. If available, the queue is very long because some restrooms are not functional.'*

Duty bearers: *'It's a common problem. Covered courts and even schools are not ready for situations like that. We need a "standard" evacuation center, but we have no vacant lot to construct that.'*

The most pressing issue for rights holders is the lack of support in accessing post-disaster livelihood assistance. Farmers report the unrealized promise of asset protection by a certain government agency:

Male farmer: *'Our crops are insured. But it is difficult to comply with the requirements within the prescribed period of 2 to 3 days. We prioritize the reconstruction of our damaged houses. When the deadline lapsed, we cannot claim anymore.'*

Female farmer: *'Our homes are far from government offices. Some of us are confused in filling up government forms. Technicians are giving us instructions on how to comply with the requirements, but if we fail to comply, our papers seem to have no value anymore.'*

Duty bearers: *'We need to cascade down to the community the information on how to process documents so farmers can really comply with it. We have an assigned staff at the Municipal Agriculture Office to do this. This year, we scheduled an orientation for our farmers about PCIC. We are still doing the same to our fisherfolk.'*

The rights holders confirmed that situations like these often lead to disputes among neighbors. On the other hand, duty bearers view that their DRR programs would be more successful if their annual budget and plans are approved on time; if they have fully filled up plantilla positions at the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (MDRRM) Office; if they could improve the utilization rate of the 70 percent mitigation funds; if they are able to convince the Local Chief Executive to make DRR activities a priority; if some proposals in their MDRRM Plan find their way to the Provincial DRRM Plan; and if they see quality sectoral representation to the MDRRM Council. These success indicators were not shared by rights holders. Similar to the values surfaced in the Virac FGD, rights holders in Dolores saw the availability of DRR equipment and supplies as important success

indicators, as well as the provision of essential non-food items such as hygiene kits, medicines, and medical supplies. This particular need is found to be very inadequate by rights holders. Furthermore, community-based communication channels and safe evacuation routes are also viewed to be important, along with mangrove monitoring and protection.

This divergence of views suggests that duty bearers are more inward-looking and process-oriented, whereas rights holders see more their reality grounded on the collective needs of the community, and the importance of social capital. The list of expenditures of LGU DRRM programs reveals that their interventions are generally not informed by the differential impacts of disasters to populations. For Manuel *et al.* (2018 cited in Brown *et al.* 2019, p. 19) this is more of the norm as more than half of the countries assessed for 'Leaving No One Behind' do not mention 'women', 'children', 'gender', 'disability', or 'marginalized' in their resilience policy agenda. As result, women are marginalized in pre- and post-disaster situations; fall victim to gender-based violence; are put in a perpetual exclusion from risk response and recovery efforts; and feel invisible, unnoticed, misunderstood, and unprioritized (*ibid.*, p. 55).

Key finding 3. The case of COVID-19 proved that LGUs are capable of rapidly adjusting to crises with urgency.

Figure 9 reveals that sampled provinces prioritized vaccines and medical supplies as they wallowed in the COVID-19 crisis. On average, this claimed 13.86 percent of their 2019–2021 LDRRMF. This was almost equal to inter-LGU fund transfers as COVID-19 financial assistance and flood control projects. The same expenditure pattern can be observed in Dolores (see Figure 12 where COVID-19 quarantine facility expenditures consumed an average of 51 percent of their LDRRMF in the 2019–2020 period. The LGU has in fact spent all its LDRRMF in 2020. Similarly, in Virac (see Figure 14, the stockpiling of medical supplies and food during the pandemic was given the highest budget priority at 28.02 percent, although it was unable to spend around 10.5 percent of its LDRRMF in 2020. What hastened this was the DBM's Local Budget Circular (LBC) No. 124-2020 directing all LGUs to utilize and, if necessary, adjust their approved Annual Budget 'to contain the spread of the virus' (Department of Budget and Management, 2020). From a public policy perspective, this situation exemplifies what Kingdon (2003) calls the coupling of 'problem and policy', where COVID-19 serves as the 'focusing event'. This window of opportunity led policy actors to effect policy change and new directions. For local CSOs and other non-state actors, this begs the question: is climate change and its triggered disasters not considered 'a focusing event' to trigger a sense of urgency among state actors and communities? Or has it lost its valence only to resurge when a spectacle of destruction and death comes to view?

Key finding 4. Anticipatory actions are visibly part of the local DRR policy discourse, except pre-emptive cash transfers.

The FGD reveals that the anticipatory release of cash assistance is not yet possible in the absence of official guidelines from the national government. ECHO is advocating for the adoption of anticipatory actions 'in order to address, in a timely manner, immediate and life-saving needs resulting from a rapid-onset crisis and/or a deterioration (a crisis within a crisis) and when no other response mechanisms are yet in place' (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2021, p. 61). Anticipatory actions are those that can be done within the limited window of opportunity, that is, between the raising of the alarm and the actual onset of the calamity. The FGDs confirmed that LGUs have implemented the pre-emptive evacuation of people and livestock, called for early harvest of crops, and distributed food and non-food items in the face of imminent typhoons – but never cash. Comparatively, according to Gentilini (2016), 'long-term global trends in concentration of people, economic activity, and technology are creating a landscape that is increasingly conducive for cash as an appropriate humanitarian response'. Between cash and in-kind assistance, effectiveness is in favor of cash, because cash is fungible, less paternalistic, and more utility-maximizing, therefore it also transfers

power to those who hold it. Moreover, the flexibility provides people with a choice, helping them either to save or to consume, making the local economy still resilient amidst calamities (The Economist, 2018). This need is echoed by a women's sector representative in LGU Virac:

'Our capacities are limited even before the onset of a calamity. According to our Municipal Officials, the government is not allowed to release financial assistance prior to a calamity.' (FGD woman participant, Virac)

The LDRRMO confirmed that they cannot yet implement anticipatory cash assistance similar to that of Oxfam, although LGUs are taking initial steps towards this end. For example, the Provinces of Western Samar and Southern Leyte have concluded a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Philippine Red Cross in June 2021 on forecast-based resilience for shelter strengthening and livestock protection and evacuation. Except for anticipatory cash transfer, the scope of collaboration ranges from risk analysis, trigger development, and other capacity building, to distribution of welfare goods; although the report mentioned Memorandum No. 60, which is yet to take effect, increasing LGUs' access to the 30 percent QRF for early actions once weather forecasts indicate a 15 percent population affectation by an imminent calamity (Poterie, 2021, p. 2). In BARMM, the Chief Minister signed Memorandum Order No. 0392-2021 creating an inter-ministerial Anticipatory Action Technical Working Group (TWG) tasked to (i) develop and pursue hazard-specific AA tools for BARMM, and (ii) advise the BARMM DRRMC pertaining to preparedness and anticipatory actions (Office of the Chief Minister, 2021). Still, pre-emptive cash transfer is outside the scope of the local policy.

Box 2. How the CSC process leveraged people's voices and choices in DRR?

The National DRRM Plan 2020–2030 points out the need for the 'development of a transparent budget tracking and social audit mechanism, and for the vulnerable sectors to participate' (NDRRMC, 2020, p. 43). The employment of Community Score Card approach to social audit revealed the convergent, divergent, and to a large extent, incongruent worldviews between duty bearers and rights holders. This calls for a review of some critical discursive practices in the Local DRRM Council that duty bearers may find discomfiting, whereas for the rights holders, empowering.

More than a language-in-use, discourse is also about action and specific patterns of interaction through symbolic means (Streeter, 2013, p. 489). Symbolic means include 'who says what?', 'to whom it is said?', 'where it is said?', 'how it is said?' among other elements in a rhetorical situation. The CSC process employed has veered away from the usual norms of deliberations, for instance, in the MDRRM Council where CSOs' participation is, in Arnstein's (1969) Ladder of Participation, more of a tokenism. On the contrary, the CSC process demonstrated what a genuine dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders looks like and feels like. The interface meeting, facilitated by a third-party entity bearing objective data, in a venue considered to be a politically neutral space, and under a respectful but candid norm of exchange of ideas, has finally brought the two sectors to 'talk to each other', and not in 'silos' as alluded to in the GAR 2022 (UNDRR, 2022, p. 15). These symbolic practices observed in the CSC process discard peculiar practices of each sector when left on their own. Consequently, knowledge and

knowledge creation, which are powers assigned by duty bearers to themselves on account of their technical expertise, has also been diffused. Discourse, according to Foucault (1978) is a means to create the world, conveys ideas about the person issuing the language (its gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position), creates knowledge and ‘truth’, thereby creating power (Whisnant, 2012, p. 6). During FGDs, the facilitators detected subtle rhetorical and discursive patterns operating within the small group engagements. The political weight in favor of DRRM was barely visible: in terms of attendance and availability of data. The distinct discursive patterns between state and non-state actors were also at play. State actors are inclined to be formal and cognizant of positionality as reflected in tones, validation of ideas based on ranks, and emphasis on internal process and meanings according to their parlance; whereas representatives of the vulnerable sectors were more informal in tones, egalitarian both in their views about what constitutes risks, and in their postures as they suggested solutions to what they see as the problem. This informal atmosphere of inter-sectoral dialogue is much different from the formal proceedings in the Local DRRMC, where the agenda, discussions, and even seating arrangements are structured by norms set by duty bearers. Bringing them back together in a plenum from separate discussions obviously changed group climate – a clash of discursive practices, problematization, and in the words of Foucault, ‘the will to Truth’. The richness of their discussions led to the proposal of a number of DRR projects, activities and mechanisms that reflect their needs. It provided a platform for the youth sector representative at the *Sangguniang Bayan* to passionately advocate for a people-centered approach to DRRM. At one point, the women’s representative remarked:

‘It’s my first time to speak in front of our Municipal Officials. I was anxious, but I overcame my anxiety.’

(Women’s sector representative, Virac)

Along the process, the caucus has collectively crafted a six-month plan that will be fed into its new LDRMMP. Annex B.4 summarizes these indicative agreements. The caucus plans to:

- Review the accreditation of CSO representatives in the LDRRMC to address the issue of lack of CSO/vulnerable groups’ meaningful participation
- Strengthen capacity building to recoup the lost opportunities during lockdowns
- Improve livelihood beneficiaries targeting system, and mapping them to ensure equitable coverage
- Improve its planning by conducting a needs-based assessment for prioritization of DRR equipment to acquire, and emergency kits to be customized according to the needs of vulnerable groups
- Establish a system for clear tracking of PPA implementation to ensure that the LDRRMF is spent as appropriated

Like the Virac CSC, the Dolores proceedings also yielded a unified six-month Action Plan that could be an input to the ongoing LDRMM planning session of the LGU (see Annex C.4). Specifically, the Dolores consensus targets to:

- Strengthen IEC on livelihood insurance as to who is eligible, what the requirements

- are, and how to access the benefits when the necessity arises
- Initiate the establishment of gender-responsive and child-friendly spaces by following the standards set forth by the DSWD-CCCM
 - Scout for potential sites where the LGU could construct a standard evacuation center
 - Resume the conduct of capacity building for CSO and community people, and the youth sector
 - Work on the eventual filling up of mandatory LDRRM positions to strengthen the capacity of the LDRRM Office
 - Properly observe the budget calendar to prevent delays in the disbursement of the 5 percent LDRRMF

More or less, these indicative plans reflect the desirable intersectionality between top-down and bottom-up approach to development planning.

5. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

In summary, this study found that (i) despite the increasing number of disasters visiting the country, the DRRM spending is still very reactive. The billions of pesos in unspent DRRMF both at the National and Local Governments from 2016 to 2021 are proof. This comes at the heels of a grim climate forecast by the UNDRR in the next 15 years, and the financial windfall from the Mandanas ruling. Also, (ii) the study found that the local government units in particular may be inclined to spend their 30 percent QRF in response to actual disasters but is less likely to spend a huge percentage of its 70 percent mitigation fund. The evidence points to weak absorptive capacity. Moreover, local duty bearers point out deliberate savings of funds due to an uncertain number of hydro-meteorological and other hazards to come within a year.

Recommendation 1. Reform the national policy that is apparently lenient on underspending. Prohibited Acts under Section 19 (a) of RA 10121 cites ‘dereliction of duties leading to destructions, loss of lives, and critical damage to facilities and misuse of funds’, and other Acts penalized under Revised Penal Code and Anti-Corrupt Practices Act. Exactly how much underspending is committed for it to be considered a ‘dereliction’ is not clear. Duty bearers, particularly those involved in influencing development patterns, must be held accountable for mass destruction, rather than framing, blaming, and naming nature as the unarrestable culprit.

Recommendation 2. Impose a stricter threshold on underspending. Falling short of that critical level should be meted with some form of fiscal disincentives, if not legal prosecution against accountable officers, e.g., inability to access loans, inability to obtain increases in the succeeding years’ budget, etc. This measure should encourage no-regret investments in pre-disaster settings.

Recommendation 3. Rethink the concept of Mitigation to include Anticipatory Actions to warrant the disbursement of funds in the face of scientifically assessed imminent danger of a hydro-meteorological nature. As in the case of COVID-19 actions, this will not only allow disbursement to increase due to administrative ease of implementation, it also provides timely succor to vulnerable populations and better coping with imminent hazards, provided that safeguards are introduced in the contingent plans where science-based information and triggers, targeting system, and monetary values are clearly laid down.

In addition, (iii) the study found that the COVID-19 pandemic has proven that LGUs are capable of drastically adjusting its directions and reinforcing its actions on the fear of the unknown. The realignment of Annual Budgets and the subsequent rapid disbursement including LDRRMF to combat the spread of the virus was a reflex of survival.

Recommendation 4. The sense of urgency exhibited by duty bearers during COVID-19 must be applied to other shocks due to climate change. Perhaps, a declaration of climate emergency at the national level may spur new vigor in the government to spend what needs to be spent, not only at the spectacle of death and destruction every after typhoon.

Recommendation 5. The government must cut bureaucratic delays in its operations: from planning, procurement, and implementation. This can be done by digitalizing its tracking system so that the duty bearers themselves shall be conscious of time as an irretrievable resource.

Moreover, (iv) the study found that LGUs' DRRM interventions do not reflect the differential impact of disaster to vulnerable groups with varying needs and concerns. This blind response enhances the disaster experience of vulnerable groups who are already facing systemic marginalization prior to any disaster.

Recommendation 6. Appropriate NGAs like DILG and OCD should mandate LGUs to adopt disaster response standards observed by International Humanitarian Actors to strengthen DRR inclusivity and sensitivity. The one-size-fits-all approach of state actors assumes undifferentiated impacts of disaster to all populations. The practice of Sex, Age, and Disability disaggregation of data, for instance, should lead to accounting of who is getting what entitlements, and by how much. This tied to the weak representation of CSOs and vulnerable groups in the Local DRRM Council. Their passive participation in the LDRRMC led to group think and tokenism that diminishes their opportunity to offer different policy perspectives. The implementation of the 5 percent Gender and Development (GAD) Budget is a low-hanging fruit that must be revisited by the LGU: how it can promote risk resilience especially among women and their children. To this end, the academic research community or the SHARPER Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Social Accountability (MEALSA) may conduct a social audit-type of social accountability and look into the details of the LDRRMC budget component. This way, LGUs are able to determine whose sector is deprived as well as the breadth and depth of such deprivation.

Finally, (v) the study found that given the alternative discursive practice in problematizing DRR and planning for its mitigation, CSOs and vulnerable groups can be encouraged to actively participate, speak their minds, and express their wealth of DRR experiences.

Recommendation 7. Local DRR duty bearers should practice good DRR governance where other policy actors such as non-state stakeholders are given the opportunity for meaningful participation. Holding a separate caucus with CSOs and vulnerable sectors prior to regular LDRRMC meetings is a step in this direction. This practice should provide venues for non-state actors to express their views in a relatively informal setting that is not alienating and not technically overwhelming. Correspondingly, research institutions should encourage probing the intersectionality of needs and interests of vulnerable populations and its traces in government programs, projects, and activities.

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ANNEXES

Annex A. Summary of Receipts, Utilization, Balances of N/LDRRMF (in Php billions), 2016–2020

| Particulars | FY 2016 | FY 2017 | FY 2018 | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | Total |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Beginning Balance | 7.77 | 35.79 | 39.08 | 53.75 | 78.50 | 214.89 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | 2.13 | 2.91 | 10.40 | 53.75 | 78.50 | 62.11 |
| QRF | 5.64 | 7.31 | 7.15 | 11.54 | 14.66 | 46.30 |
| LGUs | | 25.57 | 21.53 | 25.19 | 34.19 | 106.48 |
| Adjustments | - | - | - | 7.25 | 2.56 | 9.81 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | | | | -0.62 | -1.79 | -2.41 |
| QRF | | | | -0.53 | -0.49 | -1.02 |
| LGUs | | | | 8.40 | 4.84 | 13.24 |
| Adjusted Beginning Balance | 7.77 | 35.79 | 39.08 | 61.00 | 81.06 | 224.70 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | 2.13 | 2.91 | 10.40 | 16.40 | 27.86 | 59.70 |
| QRF | 5.64 | 7.31 | 7.15 | 11.01 | 14.17 | 45.28 |
| LGUs | - | 25.57 | 21.53 | 33.59 | 39.03 | 119.72 |
| Add: Received During the Year | 13.12 | 43.56 | 42.80 | 49.30 | 73.03 | 221.81 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | 2.87 | 12.46 | 17.35 | 18.19 | 23.67 | 74.54 |
| QRF | 10.25 | 6.00 | 7.60 | 6.27 | 6.80 | 36.92 |
| LGUs | | 25.10 | 17.85 | 24.84 | 42.56 | 110.35 |
| Total Funds Available | 20.89 | 79.35 | 81.88 | 110.30 | 154.09 | 446.51 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | 5.00 | 15.37 | 27.75 | 34.59 | 51.53 | 134.24 |
| QRF | 15.89 | 13.31 | 14.75 | 17.28 | 20.97 | 82.20 |
| LGUs | - | 50.67 | 39.38 | 58.43 | 81.59 | 230.07 |
| Less: Utilization | 10.69 | 27.98 | 19.11 | 31.80 | 72.07 | 171.64 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | 2.09 | 4.94 | 10.74 | 4.94 | 11.04 | 33.75 |
| QRF | 8.59 | 5.19 | 4.18 | 2.62 | 11.19 | 31.77 |
| LGUs | | 17.85 | 14.19 | 24.24 | 49.84 | 106.12 |
| Ending Balance | 10.21 | 51.37 | 52.77 | 78.50 | 82.02 | 274.87 |
| NDRRMF(<i>including YRRPF, RRF, MRRRP, CARED</i>) | 2.91 | 10.43 | 17.01 | 29.65 | 40.49 | 100.49 |
| QRF | 7.30 | 8.12 | 10.57 | 14.66 | 9.78 | 50.43 |
| LGUs | - | 32.82 | 25.19 | 34.19 | 31.75 | 123.95 |
| Percentage of Utilization | 51% | 35% | 36% | 29% | 47% | |
| NDRRMF | 42% | 32% | 39% | 14% | 21% | |
| QRF | 54% | 39% | 28% | 15% | 53% | |
| LGUs | | 35% | 36% | 41% | 61% | |

Source: Consolidated Report on the Audit of DRRMF, FY 2017–2020 (COA Website).

Annex B. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Virac, Catanduanes

B.1. Issues Generated Separately by DRRM Duty Bearers

| Issues | Indicator | Emotive Value | Underlying reasons |
|--|--|---------------|--|
| Insufficient funding allocated for procurement | Presence of updated physical inventory of disaster equipment and supplies | ☹️ | Takes too much time to conduct inventory |
| Restrictions on face-to-face events (CapDev) during COVID-19 | Disbursement rate of budget for capacity building | ☹️ | Zero disbursement Cannot conduct activities due to constraints on face-to-face activities |
| Poor planning (no specified items for procurement). Absence of market study (for prices) | Timely submission of Annual Project Procurement and Management Plan (PPMP) | ☹️ | Submission always late Change of priorities requires change of plans |
| Weak identification of criteria selection (livelihood) | Presence of needs-based targeting system in the post-disaster/recovery context for livelihood intervention | ☹️ | No existing list Communities missed opportunity to access livelihood support |
| Inadequate standard evacuation center | Presence of standard evacuation center | ☹️ | Not enough designated evacuation centers that can accommodate the population |
| Unclear guidelines for account codes (MOOE/CO) | Level of understanding of end user on account codes (CO/MOOE) | ☹️ | Errors in coding resulted in 'returns' from Accounting to Requesting Offices; delays procurement |
| Lack of regular implementation tracking | Regular monitoring report of implementation of PPA | ☹️ | No records maintained within MDRRMO No tracking of expenditures at RO level and LGU level |

Annex B. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Virac, Catanduanes

B.2. Issues Generated Separately by DRRM Rights Holders, LGU Virac

| Issues | Indicator | Emotive Value | Underlying reasons |
|--|--|---------------|---|
| Lack of representation of sectoral/ vulnerable groups in DRRM council and planning | Availability of DAR equipment, kits and non-food essentials | ☹️ | Absence of needs assessment; no provision for non-food essentials |
| Limited financial capacity to prepare for disasters | Presence of functional RDANA and PDANA | ☹️ | Lack of capacity building; lack of proper presentation dissemination; lack of proper documentation |
| Lack of monitoring systems for DRR plans/ activities | Presence of gender-responsive infrastructure/spaces | ☹️ | Limited access to gender-responsive spaces/infrastructure |
| Lack of community-level capacity building on DRR | Access to pre-disaster financial support | ☹️ | Absence of AA policy/law |
| Absence of functional RDANA and PDANA teams | Presence of functional community-based monitoring system | ☹️ | Inaccurate and inadequate data capture reporting |
| Absence of emergency kits provision including hygiene essentials | Representation and involvement of vulnerable sectors in DRRM | ☹️ | Lack of representation and participation of vulnerable sectors |
| Lack of women- and child-friendly spaces in evacuation centers | Continuity of community-level capacity building on DRR | ☹️ | Lack of sustainability, not localized, not needs-based |
| Lack of community-level transparency and social accountability measures | Community-based social accountability initiatives in place | ☹️ | Unexpended balances which are not budgeted and utilized; community feedback in opportunities is limited |
| | Access to livelihood support post-disaster | ☹️ | Allocated budget but not utilized; no identified beneficiaries and lack of coordination |

Annex B. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Virac, Catanduanes

B.3. Output of Interface Meeting Between LDRRM Duty Bearers and Rights Holders, LGU Virac

| DRRM Thematic Area | Indicator | Emotive Assessment | | Direction |
|-------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------|-----------|
| | | Duty Bearers | Rights Holders | |
| Preparedness | 1. Availability of DRR Equipment and Supplies, kits and non-food essentials | ☹️ | ☹️ | |
| Cuts across | 2. Timely submission of APP & PPMP | ☹️ | | |
| Preparedness | 3. Disbursement of Capacity-building Funds/Continuity of community-level capacity building on DRR | ☹️ | ☹️ | |
| Preparedness | 4. Presence of needs-based targeting system/post-disaster access to livelihood support | ☹️ | ☹️ | |
| Cuts across | 5. Regular monitoring of implementation of PPAs/lack of transparency and social accountability | ☹️ | | |
| Preparedness | 6. Presence of community-based monitoring system | | ☹️ | |
| Cuts across | 7. Level of understanding of end-user on account codes | ☹️ | | |
| Mitigation/Preparedness | 8. Representation and involvement of vulnerable sectors | | ☹️ | |
| Response | 9. Presence of functional RDANA/PDANA team | | ☹️ | |
| Response | 10. Presence of gender-sensitive/child-friendly infrastructure/spaces | | ☹️ | |
| Preparedness | 11. Presence of Evacuation Centers | ☹️ | | |
| Mitigation/Preparedness | 12. Access to pre-disaster financial support | | ☹️ | |

Annex B. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Virac, Catanduanes

B.4. Six-Month Action Plan, LGU Virac

| Thematic Area | Issues | Agreed Action | Indicator | Who Will Lead? | Timeframe | Resources Needed |
|---------------|---|--|--|---|-----------|---|
| Mitigation | Lack of representation/ involvement of sectoral/vulnerable groups | Review the accreditation of CSO | Representation and involvement of vulnerable sectors | Lead - MRDDMO, Support - OCD, SB | July | Criteria Checklist for accreditation |
| Preparedness | Mismatch/ inaccurate data captured | Updating of CBMS/ database | Presence of community-based monitoring system | Lead - MPDO, MSWDO | ASAP | |
| | Lack of community-level CapDev on DRR Restriction on F2F training Lack of RDANA/PDANA teams Confusion on Account Codes for appropriate charging of expenditure | Conduct of F2F CapDev Programs (Planning, Skills Training, Awareness Programs) | Continuity of community-level CapDev on DRR | Lead - MDRRMO Support - OCD, PRC, BFP, MSWDO | July-Dec | Funds Trainers |
| | Lack of evacuation center | Propose for fund outsourcing | Presence of evacuation centers | Lead - MPDC, Support - MBO, MDRRMO | July-Dec | Plans, Hazard profile, POW, Identified location |
| | No enabling policy for Anticipatory Actions yet | | Access to pre-disaster financial support | | | Needs enabling policy at the national level |

| Thematic Area | Issues | Agreed Action | Indicator | Who Will Lead? | Timeframe | Resources Needed |
|---------------|--|---|---|--|------------------------|---|
| Recovery | Beneficiary for livelihood assistance not identified No access to livelihood support post-disaster | Formulation of clear guidelines Mapping of potential beneficiaries | Presence of needs-based targeting system/post-disaster access to livelihood support | Lead - Livelihood Coordinator Support - MSWDO, MAO, MDRRMO Barangay Council | July–Sept | Technical support for RO |
| Cut across | Poor planning Lack of women- and child-friendly spaces in evacuation centers Absence of emergency kits and non-food essentials | Conduct of needs-based assessment for prioritization Conduct of assessment/ inventory of equipment Ensure conformity of PPAs with RA 10121; DILG MC 2012-73; JMC 2013-1 | Timely submission of APP & PPMP | Lead - MDRRMO Support - MPDC, DILG | July–Sept July–Sept | Personnel/ Inventory records |
| | Lack of regular implementation tracking systems of PPAs | Establish system for clear tracking of PPA implementation, ensure accomplishments are communicated | Monitoring of PPA implementation | Lead - MDRRMC Support - End Users, MPDO, MACCO, BLGU, Community Affairs Officer | July–Dec 2022 | Admin Order (based on inputs from RO's) |

Annex C. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar

C.1. Issues Generated Separately by DRRM Duty Bearers

| Issues | Indicator | Emotive Value | Underlying reasons |
|---|--|---------------|--|
| Approval of budget not on time (SB/SP); fund utilization pending upon review of SP | Timely approval of annual budget by SB/SP | 😞 | Delayed formulation by LFC Delayed submission by LCE Delayed approval by SB Delayed concurrence by SP |
| Not filled-up positions in DRRM Office | Complete MDRRMO personnel per RA 10121 | 😞 | Delayed creation of positions Not filling up of created positions |
| Timeline of activities not followed; LCE has other priorities | Commitment of LCE to prioritize DRR PPAs as scheduled | 😞 | Conflict with other LCE commitment/priorities |
| Project partners are not available at the barangay events | Availability of partners at the barangay level | 😞 | Lack of appreciation by CSOs of DRR mechanisms/lack of incentives for CSOs for participating community members |
| Insufficient fund allocation vs. large population and land area of Dolores; low funds but highly vulnerable | Efficiency of 70% fund utilization | 😞 | 70% fully utilized in the past 2 years |
| Lack of support from Provincial DRRM | Harmonized PDRRM-MDRRM Plans (Mitigation/Preparedness) | 😞 | Lack of coordination with LGUs on PDRRM interventions (planning & implementation) |
| Weak participation of CSO representative in MDRRC | Quality of participation of sectoral representatives | 😞 | Limited capacity of CSOs Lack of incentives for participating CSOs |

Annex C. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar

C.2. Issues Generated Separately by DRRM Rights Holders, LGU Dolores

| Issues | Indicator | Emotive Value | Underlying reasons |
|---|---|---------------|---|
| Lack of gender-responsive spaces/\ infrastructure; lack of formal/standard evacuation center | Availability of standard evacuation center | 😊 | There are identified evacuation centers |
| Lack of DRR equipment and supplies | Availability of DRR equipment and supplies | 😐 | Existing DRR equipment and supplies are not enough to support the needs of whole community |
| Absence of provision of medicines/medical supplies; absence of hygiene/sanitary kits especially for women | Provision of essential non-food items, such as hygiene kits, medicines and medical supplies | 😓 | Needs of women and elderly people must be prioritized |
| Lack of livelihood assistance post-disaster; limited information/access to livelihood assistance programs; lack of support in checking the compliance and completeness of documents for insurance claim | Access to post-disaster livelihood support | 😓 | Subjective assessment of evaluator; Red tape; Questionable integrity of process |
| Unclear or not properly communicated guidelines on beneficiary selection | Beneficiary evaluation and selection criteria are in place (post-disaster) | 😊 | Assistance is provided but selection criteria must be clearly explained |
| Lack of capacity building for youth on DRR | Presence of capacity-building initiatives on DRR especially for youth | 😊 | Capacity-building initiatives are conducted |
| Lack of participation from community members | Level of participation of community members in DRR activities | 😐 | Lack of interest/involvement of target participants (lack of incentives) |
| Lack of strict implementation and monitoring of policies in mangrove sites protection | Implementation and monitoring of mangrove/ ecosystem protection policies | 😓 | Rampant illegal cutting of mangroves |
| Lack of convenient and safe emergency routes/ roads for far-flung areas | Presence of safe and convenient routes for emergency transport/rescue operations | 😊 | There are identified emergency routes |
| Lack of proper information dissemination (limited network signal) | Community-based communication channels are in place | 😐 | There are existing communication platforms but need to consider boosting network signal and broaden reach |

Annex C. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar

C.3. Output of Interface Meeting Between LDRRM Duty Bearers and Rights Holders, LGU Dolores

| DRRM Thematic Area | Indicator | Emotive Assessment | | Direction |
|-------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------|-----------|
| | | Duty Bearers | Rights Holders | |
| Preparedness | 1. Level of participation of community members in DRR activities/Availability of partners at the barangay level | 😞 | 😞 | |
| Cuts across | 2. Timely approval of annual budget by SB/SP | 😞 | | |
| Preparedness | 3. Complete MDRRMO personnel per RA 10121 | 😞 | | |
| Cuts across | 4. Commitment of LCE to prioritize DRR PPAs as scheduled | 😞 | | |
| Mitigation/Preparedness | 5. Efficiency of 70% fund utilization | 😞 | | |
| Preparedness | 6. Harmonized PDRRM-MDRRM Plans (Mitigation/Preparedness) | 😞 | | |
| Cuts across | 7. Quality of participation of sectoral representatives | 😞 | | |
| Mitigation/Preparedness | 8. Availability of evacuation sites | 😞 | 😊 | |
| Response | 9. Availability of DRR equipment and supplies | | 😊 | |
| Response | 10. Provision of essential non-food items, such as hygiene kits, medicines and medical supplies | | 😞 | |
| Recovery | 11. Access to post-disaster livelihood support | | 😞 | |
| Recovery | 12. Beneficiary evaluation and selection criteria are in place (post-disaster) | | 😊 | |
| Preparedness | 13. Presence of capacity-building initiatives on DRR especially for youth | | 😊 | |
| Mitigation | 14. Implementation and monitoring of mangrove/ecosystem protection policies | | 😞 | |
| Preparedness/Response | 15. Presence of safe and convenient routes for emergency transport/rescue operations | | 😞 | |
| Preparedness | 16. Community-based communication channels are in place | | 😞 | |

Annex C. Community Score Card Workshop Output, LGU Dolores, Eastern Samar

C.4. Six-Month Action Plan, DRRM CSC Workshop, LGU Dolores

| Thematic Area | Issues | Agreed Action | Indicator | Who Will Lead? | Timeframe | Resources Needed |
|---------------|---|--|---|-------------------------------------|---------------|--|
| Cuts across | Delayed approval of Annual Budget Appropriation Lapse in accessing benefits due to late approval of budget | Ensure proper observance of the budget calendar & timely completion of required attachment to the budget | Timely approval of annual budget by SB/SP | LCE, MPDC, MBO, MACCO, MTO | Aug-Dec 2022 | Memo-Budget call Materials and supplies |
| Preparedness | Unfilled 2 Plantilla Positions of MDRRMO | Filling up of positions | Complete MDRRMO personnel per RA 10121 | LCE, MDRRMO, MHRMO | Aug-Dec 2022 | Budget & posting of vacant positions |
| Cuts across | Timeline of activities/ budget calendar not followed (LCE Prioritization) | Early/timely scheduling of DRR activities & secure confirmation/ approval by LCE | Commitment of LCE to prioritize DRR PPAs as scheduled | MDRRMO, Executive Secretary | Aug-Dec 2022 | Calendar of activities, program, and invitations |
| Preparedness | Lack of support from PDRRM office on disaster preparedness intervention | Express sentiments & request inclusion in the DRR issues | Harmonized PDRRM-MDRRM Plans (Mitigation/ Preparedness) | LCE-LMP MDRRMO-PF | Aug-Dec 2022 | LMP-MDRRMO Resolutions |
| Preparedness | Lack of capacity building for youth on DRR | Conduct of DRR-CCA orientations to youth sector | Presence of capacity-building initiatives on DRR especially for youth | MDRRMO, SK Fed President, Youth Org | Sept-Oct 2022 | NGO support, training materials, meals |

| Thematic Area | Issues | Agreed Action | Indicator | Who Will Lead? | Timeframe | Resources Needed |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|--|---------------|---|
| Preparedness | Weak participation of CSO/sectoral representation in MDRRMC | Conduct of capacity building to CSO/Community | Quality of participation of sectoral representatives | MDRRMO, MSWDO, LYDOSK Fed President | Sept–Oct 2022 | NGO support, training materials & supplies, budget for meals and snacks |
| Preparedness | Lack of participation from community members | | Presence of capacity-building initiatives on DRR especially for youth | | | |
| Mitigation | Lack of strict implementation and monitoring of policies in mangrove sites protection | Establishment of monitoring system | Implementation and monitoring of mangrove/ecosystem protection policies | MENRO, BDRRMO | Aug–Dec 2022 | Seedlings Meals |
| Preparedness/ Mitigation | Lack of formal/standard evacuation centers | Scout for possible sites for construction of standard evacuation center | Availability of standard evacuation center | BLGU, MDRRMO | Sept–Dec 2022 | Community Network |
| Response | Lack of gender-responsive spaces/ infrastructure (e.g., restroom for women) | Initiate establishment of gender-responsive & child-friendly spaces; follow minimum requirements of CCCM | | BDRRMC, Barangay Captain, MSWDO, MDRRMO, MEO | Aug–Dec 2022 | NGO support, project design, guidelines from MSWDO, M/BLGU funding |
| | Limited information on guidelines to access livelihood assistance | Conduct of Orientation & IEC campaign on livelihood insurance (e.g., PCIC Insurance) | Access to post-disaster livelihood support Selection criteria are in place | PCIC, MDA, MSWDO, MDRRMO | Aug–Sept 2022 | NGO support, materials and supplies |



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